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1. Introduction 
 
In his essay AIDS, Africa and Indifference: A Confession, Joel Pauls Wohlgemut 
called HIV/AIDS “a public health disaster of epic proportions.”1 The epidemic is 
neither over, nor is it successfully being fought, and at the time of this writing, it 
appears likely to grow and accompany us into the next decades – or into the next 
century. These apparent truths add a threatening and explosive relevance to the 
problem of the virus, which has reached an enormous grade of complexity. 
Writing solely about HIV/AIDS is not possible. The disease, its consequences 
and origins are never simple, monocausal or isolated. Every epidemic is multifarious 
and interdependent in its roots, analyses and solutions. Dealing with a topic such as 
HIV/AIDS automatically means dealing with a variety of different fields and 
complexes. On the socio-cultural level, factors such as sexual culture, religious 
influence, tradition, poverty, drug use, drug sale and homosexuality often impinge on 
the epidemic’s course. On a rather political level, economy, governmental influence 
and commitment, political upheavals and conflict and also the influence of non-
governmental organizations and campaigns have a considerable effect on the 
development of the disease. On a more solution-oriented basis, prevention efficacy 
and treatment access, financing and donations, the pharmaceutical industry and the 
shape of health care systems are relevant to the epidemic’s spread and can also 
decide over death or survival. To further complicate and increase the already 
overwhelming complexity of HIV/AIDS, all these factors not only impinge on the 
epidemic, but the epidemic, in turn, impinges back on them.   
  Various academic fields are included and omnipresent in a holistic debate: 
political and social science, law, economics, biology (including virology and 
epidemiology) as well as educational science and psychology, when referring to 
prevention and high-risk behaviour. To acknowledge the pandemic in its entirety, it 
is unavoidable to touch upon these various fields. This dynamic interplay is 
interesting and often overwhelming. But it is also challenging, if not discouraging, to 
realize what marathon efforts are necessary to rectify the origins, prerequisites and 
current conditions that fuel the dying. It is already clear and settled that despite 
certain improvements and steps forward, mankind will not be able to throw off a 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Joel Pauls Wohlgemut, “AIDS, Africa and Indifference: A Confession,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, Vol. 167, Sept. 2002, 485, http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/167/5/485 
(accessed 20 Dec. 2006). 
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virus that is currently living in 40 million human bodies. Hence, it might have 
sounded awkwardly fatalistic and desperate when Dr. Peter Piot, executive director 
of UNAIDS, said on the XVI International AIDS Conference in Toronto in August 
2006 that we have to plan the next 25 years with HIV/AIDS.2 Only on second 
thought, it slowly dawned that adhoc solutions would only impede what long-term 
solutions really can achieve, and that halting the pandemic would be a great success, 
reversing it a giant stride, but eradicating it is impossible and wishful thinking.                        
Chapter Two gives a survey of significant and particular developments in the 
global fight against the epidemic, which will probably shape the future course of the 
disease intensively. It includes scientific background and challenges, the financing of 
the fight against the disease and the current and possible future shape of the evolving 
epidemics in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. The epidemics in these two 
regions are as different as the regions themselves and thus show how kaleidoscopic 
HIV/AIDS reflects society and culture.  
In contrast to the following chapters, this chapter aims at providing an overall 
picture of relevant and meaningful events and developments rather than an in-depth 
analysis of more peculiar issues. The chapter attempts to achieve the balance 
between focusing on various aspects of the epidemic in order to create, or at least 
hint at, a holistic picture while avoiding the danger of drifting to superficial, 
insignificant analyses. Chapter Two also focuses on topics such as Southern Africa 
or the mechanisms of pharmaceutical companies, which are further pursued in the 
following chapters, but in complete different shape. Thus, it provides examinations 
of certain issues while simultaneously providing prerequisites, which will be helpful 
and useful for the comprehension of the following chapters.      
Chapter Three focuses on the Southern African country Botswana, which serves as a 
positive example. The focus is put on effective solutions and how they were 
achieved. It is analyzed by which means Botswana succeeded in setting up a 
pioneering and exemplary treatment programme and, thus, the vital ingredients of a 
successful response are shown. In contrast, South Africa (Chapter Four) serves more 
as a negative and also deterring example, particularly in the sense of health care, 
governmental commitment and action. Hence, the main focus is put on scrutinizing 
                                                 
2
 Cf. UNAIDS, “The Global Response”, Speech, Peter Piot, XVI International AIDS Conference: 
August 13-18, 2006. 25 Years of Reflecting AIDS - Reflecting Back and Looking Forward, 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/player.cfm?id=2701&play=4#clip_4 (accessed 20 Dec. 
2006) 
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conditions, explanations and prerequisites for a severe epidemic and an insufficient 
response.  
The contradictory country examples are consciously chosen and follow 
different approaches. The solution-based approach of the Botswana chapter 
intentionally contrasts the cause-oriented approach of the South Africa chapter, thus 
intensifying the effect and making use of a greater range of possible approaches. As 
explained above, the respective current situations and past events of the two 
countries made a decision as how to allocate the approaches fairly easy. 
 The chapter on International Intellectual Property Law is predominantly a 
chapter on treatment. It examines who receives treatment and where and why and 
who does not receive treatment and where and why in the face of patents, prices and 
economic interests. It also sheds a light on the complex that not everyone is losing in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS. Prevention, research, production and delivery of 
antiretroviral drugs have long become an almost independent branch of industry, the 
collapse of which would be massive. The chapter examines the economics behind the 
disease, scrutinizes the barriers to increased treatment access and sketches the path 
that led to an amendment of International Property Rights (IPS).  
As usual, the complexity of certain issues scrutinized in this paper turned out 
to be, admittedly, overwhelming. The fact that this complexity would partly not 
allow for any other approach than an extensive, in-depth interdisciplinary one, makes 
it unavoidable that certain issues must remain merely touched upon – considering 
their potential of analysis. With an issue like HIV/AIDS and the vast amount of 
literature and information, this appears logical and expected. Nevertheless, it might 
be useful to keep in mind that the end of a chapter not simultaneously means the end 
of a topic. The restrictions to the form and length of this paper do not necessarily 
reflect the intensity of examination the author would have preferred. 
 
2. An Overview of the Current State of the Epidemic 
 
2.1 Forward 
 
The 25-year-old history of HIV/AIDS is a story of setbacks, drama and trauma – an 
often never-ending downward spiral with lots of backlashes and a host of incessant 
bad news, but rare progress, mentionable success and legitimate reason of hope. 
Thus, every step in the right direction is vital – not only to fight the disease, but also 
to provide activists and everyone involved with the necessary ray of hope and 
stamina to continue a fight against a virus that is not invincible. The progress within 
the field of access to antiretroviral treatment can be counted among these vital 
improvements, which effectively demonstrate that AIDS-related deaths are neither 
fate nor destiny, but avoidable.  
 When writing about progress and the impetus behind its development, there is 
no getting around the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 
HIV/AIDS in June 2001. Frequently considered “a landmark in the global efforts to 
respond to the AIDS crisis”,3 the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS was 
accepted by leaders from 189 Member States for the first time in the history of the 
epidemic.4 The commitment to stronger prevention, treatment, care, support and 
leadership resulted in unprecedented global action, advocacy by civil society and 
major contribution to monitoring processes on all levels.5 The fact that by March 
2006, 126 countries submitted reports on their respective current AIDS situation can 
undoubtedly be traced back to the Special Session and is of inestimable value for 
sensible strategic planning and allocation of donations and resources.6 Moreover, this 
was the first time that civil society actively participated in collecting, analyzing and 
reviewing these data.7  
 Further progress to be elaborated on here is the increasing hope and scientific 
confidence in developing an effective and widely applicable microbicide. Apart from 
that, an increase in donations will be dealt with. This increase, however, is not 
sufficient and therefore often described as a disappointment. Nevertheless, it remains 
considerable and an exemplary sign of global participation.     
                                                 
3
 UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (Geneva, 2006) 52. 
4
 Cf. ibid. 52. 
5
 Cf. ibid. 52. 
6
 Cf. ibid. 52. 
7
 Cf. ibid. 53. 
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2.1.1 The Expansion of Access to Antiretroviral Treatment  
 
Recent progress in the field of treatment and care is astounding in many countries. 
The expansion of access to antiretroviral therapy is undoubtedly of inestimable value 
for activists, governments, donators, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
people living with HIV/AIDS in many different respects. This increased treatment 
access not only succeeded in averting 250 000 – 350 000 deaths worldwide in 2005,8 
it also provided directly and indirectly involved people with desperately needed hope 
and stamina to continue stressing and fighting the AIDS pandemic. Moreover, 
improvements in some very resource-constrained settings enabled to serve as role 
models and perfect examples that fighting this deadly disease is possible. Especially 
South Africa – the most crisis-torn AIDS region in the world – could finally succeed 
in considerably scaling up treatment significantly: the number of people on 
antiretroviral drugs doubled in 2005 alone.9 Even more surprisingly, the country 
managed to increase the number of people receiving antiretrovirals (ARVs) “from 
fewer than 5000 at the beginning of 2004 to roughly 190 000 by the end of 2005.”10 
Yet, what appears remarkable about this also appears frightening. The question how 
a country with the highest population of people living with HIV/AIDS could afford 
and dare to wait for so long to finally act and put an end to this state of paralysis will 
be scrutinized in Chapter Four.  
Even in economically deprived countries such as Kenya, 200 sites were 
installed to provide ARVs, and Rwanda managed to deliver antiretroviral drugs to 
more than 18 000 people in 2005 with further expansion and an eightfold increase in 
sites compared with 2003.11 Uganda could induce 50% coverage of treatment, while 
many other sub-Saharan countries remain to fall behind with levels below 10%.12 
Botswana, as an exemplary sub-Saharan AIDS-ravaged country, has managed to put 
approximately 50 100 people on treatment – bearing in mind that the country’s 
population is less than 2 million makes this achievement even more a giant stride. 
Equally important, Botswana’s adherence to treatment is reported to be among the 
                                                 
8
 Cf. ibid. 153.  
9
 Cf. ibid. 151. 
10
 Ibid. 151-152. 
11
 Cf. ibid. 151-152. 
12
 Cf. ibid. 152. 
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highest in the world (85-90%).13 Yet, the highest coverage of antiretroviral therapies 
in resource poor settings can currently be found in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The number of people on treatment here totalled 315 000 at the end of 2005, which 
makes up a percentage of 68%.14 
Of course, it is absolutely essential to know how many out of the 40 million 
people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide are actually in need of antiretroviral 
therapy in order to keep a sense of proportion. On the global scale, it is reported that 
seven million people need antiretroviral drugs.15 Out of these seven million people, 
1.3 million are actually receiving them, which leave 80% untreated.16 Knowing that 
four out of five people – at least some 6.7 million people – remain without therapy 
makes it hard to grasp that the global AIDS community considered this a sterling 
success. Yet, a fivefold increase between 2001 – with barely 240 000 people on 
treatment – and 2005, makes it comprehensible that UNAIDS resume that “the world 
has embarked on an unprecedented quest to move towards universal access to HIV 
care and treatment.”17 Obviously, a number of three million people on ARVs by 
2005 – as enthusiastically set up in the ‘3 by 5’ initiative in 2003 – has not been 
reached. Notwithstanding, the cost for antiretroviral therapy must not be 
underestimated. The attainments of price reductions on the global trade level remain 
remarkable.  
How the global AIDS community, pharmaceutical companies, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and various nations battled to both overcome and 
maintain this host of obstacles will bear closer scrutiny in Chapter Five. 
 
2.1.2 Microbicides – The New Hope? 
 
The basic idea behind microbicides is old and simple. Nonoxynol-9 – a so-called 
spermicidal surfactant – had been used for 50 years as a means to reduce the risk of 
unwanted pregnancy.18 After the notably more attractive ‘pill’ was designed and 
sold, spermicides, though still available on the market, became economically and 
                                                 
13
 Cf. ACHAP Review 2005, The African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (Garborone, 
Botswana, 2005) 1. 
14
 Cf. UNAIDS 2006, 152.  
15
 Cf. ibid. 152. 
16
 Cf. ibid. 155. 
17
 Ibid. 157-158. 
18
 Cf. Polly F. Harrison, Trisha L. Lamphear, “Microbicides,” 2004, The AIDS Pandemic: Impact on 
Science and Society, Kenneth H. Mayer, H.F. Pizer (California: Elsevier Academic Press, 2005) 191.  
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scientifically marginal, and research receded heavily. Despite the fact that 
nonoxynol-9 proved partially effective against sexually transmitted infections  (STIs) 
as chlamydia, gonorrhea and syphilis in the 1970s, research was reported to be 
poorly funded and overall insignificant.19 Only when it became threateningly obvious 
that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is very likely to leave the homosexual framework, the 
picture changed. When UNAIDS announced in 1996 that the female share in global 
HIV infections was 42%, interest in the nonoxynol-9 spermicide revived.20 Contrary 
to expectation, trials with these products proved ineffective and, even worse, harmful 
and favouring HIV infection. Hence, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) were left with no other choice 
than issuing cautionary statements about the use of products containing nonoxynol-
9.21 
 Much has changed since then: articles on microbicide research have risen, 
public and governmental donations have risen and, along with a considerable 
expansion of the pipeline and clinical trials, public expectations and hopes have 
risen, too.22 Moreover, the dramatic ascent in the HIV/AIDS microbicide and vaccine 
research field has also greatly stimulated research on malaria and tuberculosis (TB), 
which are equally threatening and interdependent health issues, altogether often 
referred to as the “three great global killers”.23  
 Referring to a concrete point of time or year as to finally count on 
microbicides as central part of prevention, it appears that the research field has left 
the question if and self-confidently moved on to the question when. According to the 
Global Campaign for Microbicides (GCM), which effectively leads the field along 
with the Alliance for Microbicide Development since 1993,24 a microbicide could be 
ready for distribution by the end of 2010, “if one of the five candidates that are 
currently in advanced clinical trials proves to be effective.”25 UNAIDS/WHO appear 
to be equally optimistic. According to them, 60 product leads are seriously pursued at 
the moment, of which at least eleven have already proven effective in animals. If one 
of these leads proves successful in people, too, “a microbicide could be available in 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Harrison, Lamphear 191. 
20
 Cf. ibid. 192.  
21
 Cf. ibid. 192. 
22
 Cf. ibid. 228-229. 
23
 Ibid. 229. 
24
 Cf. ibid. 213. 
25
 Global Campaign for Microbicides (GCM), “Managing Expectations around Microbicides,” June 
2006, 1, http://www.global-campaign.org/clientfiles/FS19-Expectations%20[E](1).pdf (accessed 22 
Dec. 2006). 
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five or seven years.”26 Yet, a host of challenges and obstacles have to be faced. GCM 
estimates that the first generation of microbicides “is likely to reduce risk of 
transmission by no more than 40 to 60 percent.”27 As a concrete prospect as to what 
microbicides will be capable of, the Campaign estimates that 2.5 million HIV 
infections could be averted over three years in 73 low-income countries.28 GCM also 
emphasizes that a variety of steps lie between a successful trial and the actual 
distribution of the product. First, successful clinical trials must be re-confirmed 
through repetition in different populations. Then, at least one regulatory drug agency 
must review and license the drug for use until, finally, the product can be 
manufactured, registered and introduced in the various settings.29  
The Global Campaign relentlessly repeats its dedication to the “public health 
mission”30 of the microbicide field. Neither microbicides nor vaccines are invented 
or will be distributed devoid of economic interests of pharmaceutical companies. 
This dangerous attractiveness makes it even more crucial, but challenging to ensure 
that those most critically in need of such products will be receiving them first. 
According to GCM, public sector developers and advocates are making major efforts 
to smooth the way for a widespread accessibility and affordability, mainly through 
negotiating such agreements with product sponsors.31 
 Growing scientific confidence was also borne along by growing resources. 
Since 2000, spending by the public and philanthropic sectors has more than 
doubled.32 Altogether, i.e. including governmental investments, about 55 million 
Euros total were spent globally on microbicide research, development, testing, policy 
and advocacy in 2000. This amount more than doubled in 2004 to 110 million 
Euros.33 Unfortunately, it appears to be the rule in the current fight against 
HIV/AIDS that more is never enough. Although such increments seem promising 
and edifying, GCM estimates that 220 million Euros must be raised anually over the 
next five years in order “to ensure timely development of a safe and effective 
microbicide.”34 This sum predominantly consists of research and clinical testing – 
                                                 
26
 UNAIDS, “Microbicides,” http://www.unaids.org/en/Issues/Research/Microbicides.asp (accessed 
22 Dec. 2006). 
27
 GCM 3. 
28
 Cf. ibid. 3. 
29
 Cf. ibid. 3. 
30
 Ibid. 3. 
31
 Cf. ibid. 2. 
32
 Cf. UNAIDS 2006, 144.  
33
 Cf. GCM 4. 
34
 Ibid. 4. 
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the remaining 25 million make up advocacy and policy as well as clinical trial site 
development.35 Although it is strongly believed that efficiency and user-friendliness 
will increase while prices will further drop, the obstacle of applicators and shipping, 
which in most cases outdo the cost for the product itself, remains.36  
 Eventually, it appears crucial to look behind the motivation of developing 
such a prevention tool as microbicides. It is hardly avoidable to think that 
microbicides are a substitute for the failure and incapability to reach gender equality, 
mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. It remains a fact that women in this region are very 
often not in the position to choose where, when, with whom and how they have 
sex.37 Being anatomically more vulnerable to HIV than men anyhow, an economic 
and social lack of power only increases this basic vulnerability.38 Serious attempts or 
plans of women to negotiate condom use can result in punitive responses. Apart from 
problems of gender asymmetry and often male promiscuity, which is a strong 
catalyst of the epidemic, there is also the sexual preference of so-called ‘dry sex’ in 
parts of Eastern Africa, which further complicates the entire development of a 
microbicide.39 Thus, a gel – the intended form of the microbicide – must not wet the 
vagina too much, or elsewise the man might not let the woman use it.40       
Elaborating on these elements of sexual culture and gender inequity, it becomes 
evident that the epicentre of the virus, located in sub-Saharan Africa, is not 
coincident. In other words, the settings are ideal for a virus such as HIV/AIDS. 
              
2.1.3 Donations – How a Success Becomes a Setback  
 
In 1996, when UNAIDS was launched, US$300 million were spent annually for the 
HIV/AIDS response in low- and middle-income countries. Today, this amount has 
increased 28-fold to US$8.3 billion in 2005.41 At first sight, it appears a strong and 
impressive success, a great product of united forces and collaboration of 
organizations, private households and new government programmes. This, 
undoubtedly, is true. Yet, it is also true that the epidemic is outpacing its response – 
even despite these remarkable united strides. In its 2006 Report on the Global AIDS 
                                                 
35
 Cf. ibid. 4. 
36
 Cf. ibid. 4. 
37
 Wolfgang Drechsler, “…ohne dass er’s mitbekommt,” Handelsblatt 17 Aug. 2006. 
38
 Cf. Harrison, Lamphear 193. 
39
 Drechsler. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Cf. UNAIDS 2006, 224. 
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Epidemic, UNAIDS puts it quite frankly: “The annual increases in funding have been 
impressive but, given the rapid spread of the epidemic, the resulting amounts are 
disappointing.”42 
Even more neutralizing is the fact that in 2005, the United States’ federal 
government – together with the state government responsible for nearly half of all 
health-care spendings – “committed to spending US$17.3 billion on the domestic 
response to AIDS that year”.43 The United States account for approximately 1.2 
million people living with HIV/AIDS, which make up a percentage of about 0.6%.44 
The federal government of the United States affords a sum for its 1.2 million people 
that is twice as high as what all forces on the planet afford for all people living with 
HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income countries.45 This is a noticeable and 
transferable example for overall global inequity – in the fight against HIV/AIDS and 
elsewhere. It also necessitates the question: who pays for whom in the global fight 
against HIV/AIDS? The inhabitants of the 22 high-income countries (879 million 
people (13.6%) of the world’s population) are the main donors of development aid 
for the remaining 5.5 billion people (85%) of the 148 countries classified as low- and 
middle-income by the World Bank.46 Nevertheless, it is only Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden that fulfil the goal of donating 0.7% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as promised at the UN General Assembly by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members in 1969.47 Not surprisingly, 
Japan and the United States donate sums that are incomparable in height and 
meaning to those of Denmark and the like. However, in international comparison, 
they fall awkwardly behind. In 2003, the United States had a net official 
development assistance (ODA) of 0.14 as percentage of GDP, Japan made it to 0.2.48 
Since only five of all 22 member countries of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD succeeded in keeping the promise, it was 
inescapable to renew the assistance in 2005 at the G8 Summit at Gleneagles.49 
Another commitment was to double aid to Africa, which, if partially or completely 
fulfilled, will greatly contribute to fight the growing crisis on the continent.     
                                                 
42
 Ibid. 224.   
43
 Ibid. 225. 
44
 Cf. ibid. 45. 
45
 Cf. ibid. 45. 
46
 Cf. ibid. 225. 
47
 Cf. ibid. 235. 
48
 Cf. UNAIDS, 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (Geneva, 2004) 129. 
49
 Cf. UNAIDS 2006, 235-236. 
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When stating that donations are not sufficient, it is also worth mentioning that this is 
not merely due to a lack of resources, but also due to mismatch – a faithful 
companion of donations – “between where the money was needed and where it was 
actually spent.”50 On the one hand, this can often be traced back to insufficient 
government plans that are not strategic, evidence-based and targeted enough.51 On 
the other hand, it can be blamed on a lack of agreement on priorities and a deficiency 
of comparable estimates as to what is required.52 Of course, this adds a little doubt to 
the estimates UN launched in 2001. Nevertheless, it is proven that the Global 
Tracking Consortium, the UNAIDS Reference Group on Economics and the 
UNAIDS Reference Group on Estimates, Modeling and Projections made very close 
estimates in the past. According to them, donations will rise to US$10 billion in 
2007.53 Unfortunately, they also estimate that US$18.1 billion are needed to meet the 
requirements. Even for 2006, they forecasted an amount of US$14.9 billion needed, 
which at least makes up a shortfall of around US$6 billion. The utopian sum of 
US$22.1 billion must be raised in 2008, according to their estimates, to initiate an 
effective and sensible global HIV/AIDS response.54 This, and the thesis that 
countries could afford more if they took the epidemic more seriously, is reason 
enough to see a disappointment in the 28-fold increase in donations, as mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter.  
Although it is neither intended nor possible to do an overall coverage of the 
epidemic’s financing complex here, a few elements appear worth taking into account. 
Despite the fact that 30% of all spendings in low- and middle-income countries are 
domestic, government spending has not managed to keep up with the expanded need 
for treatment, care and prevention.55 Furthermore, UNAIDS reports that out-of-
pocket spendings are included in the US$8.3 billion in 2005.56 These donations stem 
from people living with HIV/AIDS and their households. It is reported that “[i]n 
millions of cases, they were spending far beyond their capacity and being driven 
deeper into poverty and debt but still not receiving antiretroviral therapy and other 
basic services.”57       
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Despite the modest success, or relative disappointment, it must not be ignored that 
within the last four years considerable, unknown resources could be mobilized. First, 
there is the United State’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
which announced a commitment of US$15 billion over five years for the global 
AIDS fight in January 2003.58 Second, the World Bank committed a total of more 
than US$2.5 billion to HIV projects, which makes it second largest multilateral 
donor for low- and middle-income countries. US$1.15 billion were committed to 33 
projects in 33 different countries in sub-Saharan Africa through its Multi Country 
HIV/AIDS Programme, of which US$545 million have been disbursed.59 And third, 
there is the biggest multilateral donor, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, which was built on a holistic conception that treatment of these 
previously described ‘three global killers’ must be interdependent and 
comprehensive. The fact bears reminding that tuberculosis is the leading cause of 
death among people with HIV infection.60 Bill Gates, Co-chair of the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, described the Global Fund as “one of the most important health 
initiatives in the world today” 61 and underpinned his words with a US$500 million 
contribution over five years by the Gates Foundation one week prior to the XVI 
AIDS Conference in Toronto in August 2006.62 Also Dr. Peter Piot, Executive 
Director UNAIDS, described the Global Fund as ”the best model to provide strategic 
and predictable funding.”63 Reasons for this reputation do not have to be searched for 
extensively. 132 countries have begun to produce “substantial results”64 with grants 
from the Global Fund, including life-extending HIV/AIDS treatment for 544 000 
people, tuberculosis treatment for 1.4 million people and 11 million bed nets for 
malaria child protection.65 The Global Fund seeks for a new partnership approach 
between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities and 
attempts to fulfil its holistic goal by a distribution of funding. 56% of all Global Fund 
commitments up to the end of 2005 were spent on HIV, 26% on malaria and 17% on 
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tuberculosis.66 67% thereof go to low-income countries, 25% to lower-middle 
income and 8% to upper-middle income countries.67 The Global Fund’s Voluntary 
Replenishment Meetings with representatives of all stakeholder groups offer the 
chance for evaluation, strategic planning and making pledges on mutually agreed 
targets.  
It appears impossible to mention a success in the current fight against HIV/AIDS 
without mentioning the deficiencies. As the epidemic evolves, and evolves faster 
than the increase in donations, a so-called success becomes easily a ‘relative’ or 
‘modest’ success. Admittedly, the world has never afforded comparable sums of 
money for the fight against HIV/AIDS. But neither has it witnessed a comparable 
global disease. To close the gap, UNAIDS suggests two things: first, “more money 
must be raised,”68 and second, “a better use of whatever money may be available”69 
must be ensured. There are also ideas like adding an AIDS tax to air fares or income 
tax and issuing bonds.  
At least one thing is clear: the global AIDS community is dependent on more 
resources – by whatever means. In the meantime, a triage model will bring healing to 
those affected – or not.   
                    
2.2   Backward 
 
2.2.1  Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa perfectly exemplifies what the AIDS epidemic is capable of. Or, 
to put it more dramatically, but not less realistically, it is also a bitter foretaste what 
else it can do and surely would have done without all the efforts undertaken in recent 
years. The marks it has left so far on southern African life are far beyond imagination 
for western viewpoints and there is no end in sight. In fact, the virus is far from being 
tamed. It is not even captured yet. How relatively well developed countries have 
learnt to live and cope with the virus becomes clear when we dare a glance down the 
African continent, where the effects are literally devastating and the virus is partially 
deleting entire areas like the Plague. But in fact, has the HIV/AIDS virus not 
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replaced the Plague in its effects, damages and challenges? Is it not legitimate to call 
HIV/AIDS ‘the new Plague’? 
 
2.2.1.1      Circumstances, Prerequisites and Origins 
 
Currently, 64% of all people living with HIV/AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa.70 
Three quarters of all infected women worldwide – approximately 13.2 out of 17.3 
million total – are resident in sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated twelve million 
children under the age of 17 in sub-Saharan Africa have been fully or half orphaned, 
i.e. have lost one or both parents to AIDS.71 90% of the total number of children in 
the world infected with HIV/AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa. Fewer than one in ten 
of these children are being treated appropriately or even reached by basic treatment 
and support services. 
The greatest reason for the severity of this region’s epidemic can be named 
quite easily: heterosexual sex. Whereas blood transfusions, injecting drug usage or 
homosexual sex are reported to be major reasons for HIV/AIDS in certain regions in 
the world (e.g. Germany), Africa and predominantly sub-Saharan Africa are riven by 
a heterosexual AIDS epidemic that is mostly affecting women, with a clear tendency 
to affect younger women. Yet, to fully understand the uniqueness of the sub-Saharan 
AIDS crisis, one has to add up the various effects and interdependence of AIDS 
drivers such as gender inequality, impoverishment, decline of social services, rapid 
urbanization, ‘modernization’, war and conflict.72 Salim Abdool Karim, Director of 
the Center for the AIDS Programme of Research in South Africa, enumerates “social 
and political instability, disruption of social support mechanisms and family 
structures, migrancy, high rates of other sexually transmitted infections, 
opportunistic infections, the subordinate position of women, and armed conflicts.”73 
One should not forget that the rather neutral term ‘gender inequality’ in this context 
also includes subordination, violent oppression and discrimination against women.74 
Furthermore, it remains open if an HIV-infected husband’s sole decision to have 
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unprotected sex with his wife is still oppression. Especially in Africa, where the 
limitations of life-prolonging opportunities for HIV/AIDS patients are obvious, this 
kind of behaviour could also be interpreted as gradual homicide or murder on hire 
purchase. As already touched upon in the microbicide sub-chapter, possibilities for 
women to discuss places, times and partners of sexual intercourse are often grossly 
limited due to their subordinate socio-economic and cultural position.75 The fact that 
extramarital affairs of both sexes are often tolerated and partially even expected of 
men paves the way for the virus to spread. Not exclusively defined as an African 
phenomenon, young men’s need or peer pressure to prove their masculinity through 
early sexual debuts and many sexual conquests only optimizes the infectiousness.76 
The cultural tradition of bride payments (or dowries) also increases vulnerability. 
The perpetuated idea that women are thus husbands’ property leads to a further lack 
of control and overall paralysis in decision-making. This shows far-reaching effects 
in restrictions when it comes “to access to education, employment, credit, health 
care, land, and inheritance.”77 The resulting powerlessness leads to economic 
dependency that decreases the possibilities of negotiating safe sex, and, furthermore, 
often forces women to offer sex in exchange for money or goods in order to 
survive.78 
 The latter point bridges poverty and AIDS. It appears obvious that in times 
and circumstances of severe poverty, priorities shift, too. Poor conditions are not in 
favour of an AIDS priority or at least awareness and caution.79 Daily concerns 
simply do not allow a more sensible and careful approach to an issue that has not yet 
found its way into every public’s mind. Limitations of poorer people to access 
education also affect their chances to get a hold of safe-sex information. It has been 
frequently reported that there is a strong connection between safe sex and education. 
Condom use is often associated with higher levels of education, which, however, are 
connected with wealth and better social status.80 Yet, it is not that simple: Botswana, 
Namibia and South Africa are among the hardest AIDS-torn sub-Saharan African 
nations. Yet, simultaneously, they have the highest per capita gross national product 
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in sub-Saharan Africa.81 Although poverty and AIDS build a highly interdependent 
and most dangerous vicious circle, poverty cannot solely explain strongly advanced 
epidemics. 
 Hence, other reasons must be searched for to capture the complexity of 
reasons and origins in its entirety. Urban growth is a keyword here. The rapid 
expansion of urban areas – partly resulting from higher birth rates, partly resulting 
from increased migration of young men and often economically restrained women 
from rural areas – has grossly pushed HIV vulnerability ahead.82 On the one hand, it 
is obvious that resettlement is problematic and often results in poverty and its 
consequences for sexual responsibility and vulnerability. On the other hand, cities are 
known for being more sexually permissive, less restrictive in terms of sexual 
behaviour and marriage and less bound to traditional village norms.83 Especially in 
slums, the combination of poverty and very limited sexual norms can lead to early 
sexual initiation and an increase in partners.84 This demonstrates quite clearly how 
vicious the circle of poverty and AIDS is. Particularly in connection with HIV/AIDS, 
poverty and misery are always more likely to increase than fall. 
 Wars and conflicts must also be added to the already overburdened picture. It 
has been reported that “[s]ince 1980, no less than 28 of 53 African states have been 
at war.”85 In war scenarios, human rights are more likely to be hurt and sexual 
violence and rape are known side-effects.86 The risk of HIV infections is further 
increased by the necessity to revert to prostitution due to poverty triggered by war 
and oppression. Moreover, war and civil strife set off displacements of people that 
might lead to an “interruption of social cohesion and relationships, promiscuity, 
inadequate shelter, and commercial sex.”87 All these enumerated consequences of 
war increase vulnerability to HIV. But despite the given focus of the AIDS pandemic 
here, one must not forget that all this hardship itself is a far greater problem and even 
more worrisome than HIV/AIDS, which still remains a small part of the overall 
misery. It also demonstrates the vast complexity and enormous challenge of the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. If not obvious already, it now slowly but steadily dawns on us 
that treating individual sicknesses does not suffice, but that really fighting the disease 
                                                 
81
 Cf. ibid. 2014. 
82
 Cf. ibid. 2014. 
83
 Cf. ibid. 2014. 
84
 Cf. ibid. 2015. 
85
 Ibid. 2013. 
86
 Cf. ibid. 2015. 
87
 Cf. ibid. 2015. 
  22 
means eradicating the origins that create vulnerable conditions and provoke 
infection.  
And there is no scarcity of origins in sight. Deeply rooted in sub-Saharan 
society, migrancy plays a vital role in the organization and order of society.88 It is 
fundamental and unavoidable, but of high risk for contracting and spreading HIV. 
“Migrant populations [such as truck drivers or seasonal miners] create a market for 
commercial sex.”89 HIV prevalence is frequently reported to be extremely high in sex 
workers, who are legitimately counted among one of the four high-risk groups by 
UNAIDS and others. The logical consequence is that it is only a question of time 
when their main clients, namely the truck drivers, contract HIV, too. After a certain 
time, they return home and probably infect their regular sex partners, who then, in 
cases of pregnancy or forthcoming pregnancy, are at risk to infect their children.90 A 
survey of a gold mining area near Johannesburg unveiled that 20% of the 88 000 
miners and 75% of the 500 sex workers who serviced the miners were HIV-
positive.91 Fortunately, the number of miners is considerably higher than the number 
of sex workers. Yet, it would be useful, if the survey delivered the percentage of 
miners who actually consult sex workers in order to evaluate the risk of infection. 
Another concrete example is that of the paving of the highway from Kinshasa 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Mombasa on the Indian Ocean. It is 
estimated that 90% of the sex workers working on the East African part of the road 
harbour HIV and, thus, help carrying it to the most remote corners of the continent.92 
 
2.2.1.2   Solutions in a Nutshell 
 
The list of prerequisites and origins is not only long, it also consists of deeply rooted 
cultural traditions and ways life is organized. Apart from individual treatment, a 
targeted intervention is vital to eradicate the prerequisites for the disease 
comprehensively. But considering this lengthy list of deficient situations, a 
comprehensive approach would mean turning almost the entire continent upside 
down. The agenda would be overburdened, rather utopian, and, apart from 
limitations to the feasibility, perhaps not unanimously wanted. The antidote must be 
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of a different nature. Solutions must be found to change HIV vulnerability and halt 
the spread of the disease to avoid the self-extinction of a continent, dramatically 
speaking. Armed conflicts, poverty, social disruption, discrimination against women 
and involuntary commercial sex must not only be fought for the sake of HIV/AIDS. 
They are major problems themselves that cause suffering and injustice and are a 
violation of internationally approved human rights. Nevertheless, fighting these 
conditions means fighting the grounds for AIDS. Yet, imminent suffering must not 
be forgotten. A mere concentration on these roots would not only make people living 
with HIV/AIDS fall short, but moreover neglect direct AIDS prevention, including 
condom distribution, free counselling and treatment, awareness raising, safe-sex 
information and sexual education, and safe blood transfusions. These preventive 
tools are most common and have been proven successful many a time. Positive 
examples are there – they must be followed and repeated. 
 Botswana, recently South Africa and Uganda have taken pioneer status in 
successful prevention and reduction of HIV prevalence. Uganda succeeded in 
diminishing HIV prevalence in pregnant urban women steadily for eight years in a 
row, from 29.5% in 1992 to 11.25% in 2000.93 By means of “a multi-pronged effort 
to provide information, education, and communication through decentralized 
community-oriented programs,”94 behaviour changes could be accomplished. Sexual 
intercourses could be delayed, abstinence was partially achieved and condom use by 
single women aged 15-24 almost doubled between 1995 and 2000/2001. In Kampala, 
98% of the high-risk group of sex workers (‘high-risk’ in terms of both receivers and 
carriers) reported that they had used a condom the last time they had sex.95 Yet, if 
this exemplary development and the figures are true, it bears reminding that wide 
condom use is very closely linked with gender equity, or at least a minimum of 
female decision-making. Structural conditions must be given to allow negotiation of 
safe sex, but such conditions remain anything but the rule in many (sub-Saharan) 
African countries. Therefore, Mutangadura demands that “[l]aw and policy makers, 
community leaders, and other people in positions of power should recognize the 
connection between women’s economic and social status and their vulnerability to 
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HIV-1 infection,”96 legitimately emphasizing that the female role in this business is 
critical enough to be made a policy priority. 
 Many suggestions as how to tackle the greatest health and developmental 
threat to the continent reveal the “complex interplay of behavioral factors and factors 
that affect transmission.”97 For example, stigma and discrimination are great allies of 
the virus and perfect presuppositions for its spread. It appears hard to grasp that 
stigma is still an issue in countries that have HIV prevalence rates above 20% or 
30%. The question is how numerous a minority must become to leave fears of 
discrimination behind? Unfortunately, this question will probably not keep its 
hypothetical origin as the epidemic matures. The question is: will stigma only stop 
when the number of infected people will outdo the number of the uninfected? 
Countless people are afraid of either being tested or seeking treatment due to (fears 
of) discrimination. If tested HIV-positive, people are afraid of telling their husbands 
and/or sex partners the results due to fears of exposure to violence or abandonment.98 
Another reason for fighting stigma is that apathetic governments make use (or rather 
abuse) of it. As long as the public is uneducated about AIDS, scared and insecure 
about the legitimacy or right to treatment and government action, political leaders do 
not have to fear public pressure or demands. According to Abdool Karim, fear and 
prejudice are the most common ingredients for discrimination. Denial, secrecy and a 
scientifically unfounded perception of AIDS as “a universally fatal disease, acquired 
through immoral sexual acts,”99 prevent people from either seeking or demanding 
Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) and treatment. As the majority of Africans 
who are infected are said to be unaware of it, it seems vital to make testing more 
popular and common. VCT is reported to be “easier, cheaper, and more effective”100 
today due to rapid testing that does not let people hang in the balance for an awkward 
while. Yet, from a health care point of view, it appears ethically questionable to 
encourage people to find out their sero-status without having sufficient capacities and 
opportunities to treat them. In other words, fighting stigma, myths and irrational fears 
in order to talk people into getting tested presupposes (a) sufficient treatment 
resources in antiretroviral therapy and (b) sufficient trained personnel to manage the 
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implementation of such programmes.101 Currently, both are unsatisfactory. 
Therefore, a mammoth scaling-up plan of treatment, condom distribution, health care 
infrastructure and sexual education is necessary, but not feasible without additional 
funding.102 
 Additionally, although it is unpleasant to mention among so many sinister 
prospects, it dawns that the worst is yet to come in Africa. One must not forget that 
people who seek treatment today have been infected approximately up to seven years 
ago when HIV prevalence rates were considerably lower than they are today. The 
reason for this is the latency period between infection and so-called full-blown 
AIDS, when people are facing actual life-threatening illnesses.103 A prognosis from 
Colin Mathers and Dejan Loncar of the WHO in the journal PLoS Medicine says that 
in the year 2030, 6.5 million people will die from AIDS, which will then be the 
biggest deadly infectious disease on earth.104 According to UNAIDS, in 2006, 2.9 
million people have lost their lives to AIDS, and 4.3 million have become newly 
infected (with one third living in sub-Saharan Africa).105 Yet, to relativize Mathers’ 
and Loncar’s thesis, the invention (and actual distribution) of a vaccine, for example, 
could change the complete picture again. Hence, it appears questionable to foresee an 
epidemic’s course that has already deceived so many.         
Despite all the different challenges that demand efforts from so different and 
numerous fields and institutions, Salim Karim seems to know the major weaknesses 
that cripple progress on his continent: “Nothing less than energetic national 
commitment and political will are demanded to deal with this challenge and to 
reverse its ravishes.”106                          
 
2.2.2 A New Danger Evolves in the East 
 
For some experts, it appears not appropriate anymore to speak of avoiding a crisis in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia – the crisis is already there. Currently, 1.5 million 
people are infected with HIV in the region, with an estimated number of unrecorded 
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cases that extends to 2.3 million, or more.107 Of course, one could argue that in 
relation to the size of the Eurasian population, the number is comparatively small. 
But this turns out to be ignorant when facing the fact that this number means “a 
twenty-fold increase in less than a decade,”108 with a rather tiny amount of 30 000 
reported cases in 1995.109 This makes predominantly Russia and the Ukraine, but 
also their Eurasian neighbours home to the fastest spreading HIV epidemic in the 
world.     
Despite similarities in urgency and speed of increase in HIV cases, the 
evolving AIDS crisis in Eastern Europe and Central Asia appears diametrically 
opposed to the sub-Saharan AIDS pandemic in its characteristics. The marginal share 
of injecting drug users in Southern Africa accounts for the majority of people living 
with HIV/AIDS and most-at-risk people. The phenomenon of an almost sole 
heterosexual and closely gender-linked AIDS crisis remains African. The needle, 
therefore, remains the symbol that characterizes the Eurasian AIDS crisis. In 
countries such as Iran, Ukraine and Estonia, which all have comparably low HIV 
prevalence rates below 2%, transmission attributable to intravenous drug users 
swings from 72%-90%.110 In Ukrainian cities Odessa and Simferopol, around 58% of 
injecting drug users have tested HIV-positive, and in Odessa, 67% of those sex 
workers who also inject drugs were HIV-positive.111 In general, it can be said that 
more than 70% of all HIV cases in the entire Eurasian region are drug users.112 It 
becomes clear that HIV/AIDS leaves the framework of sexual transmission here, 
which so centrally described in the sub-Saharan Africa chapter.  
A holistic approach would necessitate the origins and roots of drug use, which 
inescapably widen the whole context to an even greater complexity. Yet, for this 
particular examination, it is not necessarily vital to go as deep as to scrutinize the 
reasons for human addiction. It is also important to examine the conditions to get a 
hold of drugs, in other words: the availability of drugs and the market conditions. 
Chris Beyrer of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore 
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believes that “[a]n HIV epidemic is following the trail of heroin from Afghanistan 
through central Asia to Eastern Europe.”113 He supposes that Afghanistan produced 
4200 tons of opium in 2004 and that “income from poppies far outstrips that from 
legitimate crops such as wheat.”114 Although Beyrer believes that the Ukrainian 
epidemic is fuelled by locally grown opiates, he attaches great importance to the 
proximity to overland drug trafficking routes and limited access to HIV prevention 
and drug treatment for intravenous drug users.115  
UNAIDS reports that antiretroviral therapy covers 21 000 out of 160 000 
people in need of treatment at the end of 2005, reminding us that injecting drug 
users, who account for more than 70% of HIV cases in the region, only represent 
about 24% of those receiving antiretroviral therapy.116 Nevertheless, despite these 
discouraging figures, high hopes are attached to the treatment potential of the 
Russian Federation, which has the biggest AIDS epidemic in all of Europe. Although 
it is estimated that the 350 000 officially registered cases only make up to a third of 
actual HIV cases, Russia is said to have some attributes that could put it in a good 
position to fight the sickness. In contrast to many of its neighbours, the country is 
said to have “a functioning, albeit dilapidated, infrastructure; armies of highly trained 
health professionals: oil-enriched financial resources; and, crucially, signs of 
growing political will.”117 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
is the biggest external donor in Russia and has successfully brought down 
antiretroviral drug prices from US and EU levels of US$6000 - 7000 a year to an 
average of US$2000. Hence, Richard Feachem, head of the Global Fund, 
encouragingly announced at the first Eastern European and Central Asian AIDS 
Conference in 2006 that universal access to ARVs will not be achieved by 2010, as 
targeted at the Gleneagles G8 meeting in 2005, but two years earlier in 2008.118          
Yet, the disease does not remain a symptom of the drug scene – although it 
must be said that the virus originated from men who have sex with men. It was only 
from the 1990s onwards that HIV/AIDS left the homosexual framework to 
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increasingly affect intravenous drug users.119 It appears to be a rule in the spread of 
HIV that an explosion in high-risk groups – such as homosexual men and drug users 
– must automatically lead to a more generalized concentration. Sooner or later, the 
virus leaves the concentrated field of individuals who engage in high-risk behaviour 
and moves on to wider, generalized fields. The rush to the heterosexual ‘scene’ 
indicates the ascent to a generalized epidemic that can potentially reach the entire 
population. This thesis, or rule, derives from that fact that some men who have sex 
with men also have sex with women. Moreover, infected intravenous drug users also 
participate in unsafe sex. Hence, HIV in Eurasia spreads from injecting drug users, 
who happen to be predominantly male, to their sexual partners and beyond.120 As 
women are biologically more vulnerable to HIV and men more likely to carry the 
virus due to male supremacy in the drug scene, an increasing feminization of the 
Eurasian epidemic only remains a question of time. As the disease settles in 
heterosexual people, women are becoming more and more involved. In 2004, in the 
Russian Federation, 38% of total registered cases were in women, and there is a clear 
trend among girls in their late teenage years.121  
 The Eurasian AIDS pandemic is not huge or endemic, but it is growing. And 
a disease that is rapidly growing will most probably turn big. The dangerous thing 
about the crisis in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is that its current HIV prevalence 
seems low compared to other crises as in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, this impression is 
deceiving: its true threat lies in the enormous speed of growth and spread. Thus, to 
avoid the logic of the disease’s snowball effect, it is vital to prevent a potential 
disaster instead of submitting to damage control, which is no promising venture. The 
Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Europe and Central Asia, set up at a high level 
international meeting in Dublin in February 2004, plans to eliminate HIV infant 
infection by 2010.122 The Partnership declared to offer access to treatment and harm 
reduction services to 80% of drug users by 2006 and universal HAART (highly 
active antiretroviral therapy) access by 2010.123  
Yet, legality remains a great problem in the field of drugs that impedes 
prevention. The strict legal penalties for the possession of drugs often make it 
difficult for health workers to provide syringes and other harm reduction services 
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without making themselves liable to prosecution.124 In Russia, this is due to the 1998 
Federal Law on Narcotic and Psychoactive Substances, which experienced the vital 
amendment in 2004 that provision of syringes and needle-exchange is necessary to 
fight AIDS and does not propagate illegal drug use.125 Yet, this is still an obstacle in 
many other countries, and it undoubtedly remains an ethical conflict in how far drug 
users can be supported without promoting drugs. 
 However, the four most-at-risk groups, sex workers, prisoners, homosexual 
men and injecting drug users, are not only classified most-at-risk because of what 
they are or what they do. They are also positioned on the very margins of society. 
These positions do not have a strong lobby and people are exposed to discrimination, 
bias and a lack of support, financially and else. But now the epidemic leaves this 
subcultural framework, and the EU fears its trading bloc to be crippled – an incentive 
to act.    
                                    
2.2.3 An HIV Vaccine – Magic Bullet/Predictable Failure 
 
Admittedly, the mere thought of an HIV vaccine, an antidote, a magic bullet, is 
exceedingly tempting. With all these relentless challenges, never-ending obstacles 
and misery, the sole idea or possibility of a vaccine that heals every infected cell in 
every infected body, is highly attractive. All efforts and strains to change behaviour, 
all traumas that infected or affected people had and have to face were obsolete. The 
present would transform into memories of an era that left mankind paralyzed and 
incessantly demonstrated the supremacy of an invulnerable virus over a united and 
well-funded group of scientists.       
Unfortunately, yet not surprisingly, reality is different. The ‘magic bullet’ or 
‘miraculous pill’ remains magical and miraculous – not real. The truth is that there is 
no vaccine. And the truth is that there is no vaccine in sight. And if at one stage or 
another, a vaccine will be designed, it will most probably not be able to kill the virus 
completely and release immunity. Furthermore, it will have to be delivered and made 
available to economically constrained settings, which brings us back to problems of 
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infrastructure that currently impede coverage of treatment, prevention or awareness 
raising.         
Obviously, there is a host of daunting obstacles, limitations and great 
challenges. Yet, there are also countless new scientific insights, numerous promising 
trial candidates, increased funding and a vivid landscape of partnerships. In short, 
there are various reasons for optimism and pessimism alike that will now both be 
looked at.  
 
2.2.3.1   Past and Current Shape of the AIDS Vaccine Industry       
 
One reason for failure can surely be found in a belated, under-funded beginning of a 
serious HIV vaccine research. It appears comprehensible, but not ethically legitimate, 
that major government incentives were missing in the wake of the epidemic, when it 
was unforeseeable that HIV/AIDS would transform from a disease of a minority to a 
health threat on an unimaginable scale.126 Hence, it is little surprising that at that time 
“the HIV vaccine development effort by major pharmaceutical companies was 
limited or non-existent.”127 Even in 2003, Seth Berkely, president and chief 
executive officer of the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), reported that 
“less than 1% of health research and development is directed to developing an AIDS 
vaccine.”128 By the mid-1990s, after little progress, scientists abandoned and told 
Berkely that the vaccine effort, which at that time constituted 7% of the National 
Institute of Health’s (NIH) AIDS budget, was pointless and doomed to fail.129 
Additionally, vaccines had been classed as unprofitable by the private sector and 
even many AIDS activists considered drug treatment more vital than a vague search 
for a vague vaccine.130 Yet, the NIH-funded HIV Vaccine Trials Network and the 
founding of the IAVI, which started in 1996 with fundings of US$100 000, marked a 
corner-stone in the evolution of research development. These pioneering examples of 
public-private partnerships were said to be able to support international trials of 
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privately developed vaccine candidates and were widely considered “to have jump-
started HIV vaccine development to some extent.”131 In 2001, only five years after its 
launch, the IAVI had raised US$250 million and involved several countries and 
foundations in their agenda of accelerating scientific research, amplifying the global 
demand for a vaccine and creating incentives, such as tax credits, for pharmaceutical 
and biotechnological companies.132 Along with the community and consumer-based 
AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition (AVAC), founded in 1995, IAVI also devoted 
itself to ensure global access and delivery of vaccines in the case of a scientific 
breakthrough. Other partnerships, such as the European Vaccine Effort Against 
HIV/AIDS (EuroVac) bring European preventive candidates into Phase I clinical 
trials.133 The South African AIDS Vaccine Initiative (SAAVI) has been co-ordinating 
research, development and testing in South Africa since 1999.134 The Dale and Betty 
Bumpers Vaccine Research Center, created by the US NIH and the public-private 
Canadian Network for Vaccines and Immunotherapeutics (CANVAC), are American 
and Canadian equivalents, focused on research.135  
It has been portrayed how numerous organizations, international partnerships 
and laboratories are jointly working towards a scientific breakthrough. It is 
noteworthy that compared with the age of the HI virus, most of these undertakings 
can be considered relatively new. It has been strongly emphasized how essential 
international collaboration and exchange of scientific insights are. Private-public 
undertakings can surely be pinned hope on for future vaccine science. But despite all 
these efforts, one bitter fact, a question and a fear cloud the current debate. First, the 
fact remains that there is no effective vaccine at the moment. Second, the question 
remains how long infected and affected people must wait until a vaccine is 
developed, sufficiently tested, licensed and ready for delivery. And third, the fear 
remains that a vaccine is sheer utopia, mere wishful thinking and simply beyond 
scientific potential – a fact which must sooner or later be accepted. There is no 
satisfying result at present, and it is unknown when and if a vaccine will be designed 
in the future. This described fact, this question and this fear currently build a trinity 
of failure. The only question now is: are all these undertakings and new insights by 
failure in endless trials, which taught scientists what options to exclude, increasing or 
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decreasing the possibility of a future success? Robert C. Gallo puts it like this: 
“Indeed, many scientists regularly acknowledge the possibility of the impossibility of 
success.”136 And unfortunately, this appears comprehensible, as the following 
scientific problems and hurdles show. 
 
2.2.3.2   Scientific Background, Challenges and Results 
 
At the attempt of familiarizing oneself with the virology and immunology of the 
virus, it becomes imminently clear how great the scientific challenges to capture the 
virus really are. This is not exclusively due to the terminology and necessity of 
sophisticated scientific background knowledge, but also simply due to the fact that 
the characteristics and ‘defense mechanisms’ of the HI virus are highly complex.  
One of the biggest obstacles described by Gallo is the fact that HIV is a 
retrovirus: there is not one single documented case of a complete viral clearance in 
retroviruses.137 HIV has the ability to integrate its genes into the target cell DNA so 
quickly that a lifelong infection can only be prevented at the time of initial exposure 
to the virus.138 This occasion is obviously very rare and, thus, of no relevance to the 
development of a vaccine. Moreover, attempts of the immune system to defend itself 
against the intruder only seem to strengthen the virus. In order to escape from 
cellular or humoral antiviral immune responses, the virus reacts with a great breadth 
of mixed and matched mutations, which can be traced back to the virus’ high rates of 
genome recombinations.139 Trivially speaking, the virus knows how to defend itself 
against its enemies. Every attempt to fend off the intruder only makes the virus 
stronger, more numerous and faster. HIV is reported to have exceedingly high 
mutational and recombination mechanisms, which are capable of generating 
extensive pools of mutant viruses. All this is due to the fact that the virus replicates 
itself – actively and consistently.140 It selectively infects CD4 T-helper cells, which 
control the immune system’s response to infectious diseases, destroys them 
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progressively and, in the absence of treatment, avoids their regeneration, which 
initiates an immune system collapse.141 The metaphor of the orchestra (immune 
system) that is lost and unable to play its tune without the conductor (T-helper cells) 
might serve as a useful illustration here. 
Yet, HIV, like all viruses, is a parasite. Unlike bacteria, it is not capable of 
multiplying on its own. As a retrovirus, it does not carry its genetic information in 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), but in RNA (ribonucleic acid). Hence, in order to 
survive and improve its chances to evolve, which is what all life does, HIV must 
convert its RNA into DNA and then back into RNA.142 But it can also rest in an 
inactivated cell for years and only begin replicating once again when it is activated, 
literally like a time bomb.   
 These very narrowly portrayed characteristics had made and still make it 
highly challenging to develop a vaccine. One approach was to use attenuated, i.e. 
weakened, and actively replicating live HIV. Large numbers of effective vaccines 
against other viral diseases have been developed on these grounds. Yet, the 
insurmountable problem is that there is a serious danger that attenuated HIV would 
cause AIDS. The next logical step, to use whole killed HIV, could equally be 
precluded because it is uncertain that all virus particles can be inactivated.143 
Moreover, it has only worked poorly in animal testing, which automatically leads us 
to another considerable problem: the testing object.  
Several studies have been undertaken in so-called long-term non-progressors 
(LTNPs). This minority group of people stays healthy for years without immune 
danger or need for treatment. Unfortunately, the results won from LTNPs that both 
CD4 T-helper and CD8 T-cytotoxic are needed for immunological control turned out 
to be not directly applicable to HIV vaccine development due to specific genetic 
similarities, only found in LTNPs.144 (T-cytotoxic cells are also called killer cells that 
can seek out infected cells and destroy them.) Yet, the insight that an abnormally 
high amount of CD8 cells in LTNPs’ blood successfully prevents them from 
symptoms of AIDS has pushed vaccine research forward.  
Another interesting phenomenon is the group of so-called HEPs (HIV 
exposed, persistently seronegative). In a Kenyan and Nairobian cohort of sex 
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workers, HIV-specific CD8 T-cell responses have been detected. Unfortunately, it 
remains unknown, whether these responses are solely responsible for protection.145 
Testing group number three are animals, preferably chimpanzees. A variety 
of other animal models has proven ineffective and inapplicable. The main reason for 
this is that HIV does generally not cause disease in other species than human.146 This 
is undoubtedly a great luck for the spread and fight against the epidemic, which 
would otherwise surely grow extensively in its threat, scope and efforts to fight it. 
Notwithstanding, this exceptionality gravely impedes vaccine development. 
Although it has been found that chimpanzees can be infected with HIV, their bodies, 
however, have the ability to control the infection without treatment.147 Moreover, 
chimpanzees are counted among an endangered species and, thus, are less available 
for research purposes. Macaques, therefore, are more commonly used and can be 
infected with the simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV), the ‘monkey version’ of 
HIV. Although these tests brought some results, the differences between HIV and 
SIV turned out to be too substantial to predict an effectiveness of a vaccine candidate 
in humans.148 Nevertheless, high levels of CD8 cells in vaccinated monkeys have 
again been declared reason for infection control.    
 Despite these already sufficient scientific challenges, there is a variety of 
additional serious problems to overcome: HIV not only contains a vast genetic 
diversity within one individual body, it also contains extraordinarily high levels of 
viral genetic diversity, which is geographically distributed around the entire globe 
and constantly evolving.149 This enormous global variability has already been 
subdivided into nine so-called ‘clades’ or families of HI viruses. Now, the question is 
whether a vaccine for the North American clade B also works in the sub-Saharan 
African clade C.150 The answer has yet to be given. 
 Another problem is global inequity. Vaccines must neither be too expensive 
nor too difficult to transport, store and administer to find their way into resource-
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constrained settings.151 IAVI, AVAC and others are fighting for this end. Yet, it 
remains a problem that pharmaceutical companies withdraw from vaccine research 
due to philanthropic pressure to put down vaccine prices and patents immediately 
after its discovery. Pharmaceutical companies are profit-oriented rather than 
philanthropic and also have to make sure that they can recoup their often gigantic 
drug development costs. Especially since the patent law controversy in this century 
and the huge amount of activist pressure on companies to drop prices and patents, 
which will be subject to larger scrutiny in Chapter Five, pharmaceutical companies 
might be deterred to seek for a vaccine. From an economic viewpoint, there is the 
partly legitimate fear of making insufficient profit with a vaccine. International 
pressure to drop the patents and prices of a vaccine would most likely force the 
company to give it away to the public for an economically unsatisfactory amount of 
money. 
Furthermore, it remains a given that those populations most badly in need of 
vaccines, be it malaria, TB or HIV/AIDS, also happen to be those least capable of 
undertaking extensive research. Conversely, those who have the technical 
opportunities and resources happen to be those whose need for a vaccine is 
considerably smaller, as their continued existence does not depend on it.152 
 
2.2.3.3 Daring a Glimpse towards the Future – Scientific Prospects 
 
In mid-2004, 30 candidate vaccines were in early human trials in 19 countries on 
various continents. In 2007, one particularly promising candidate, named Ad-5, will 
be tested in a Phase IIb trial.153 Ad-5 is a cold-causing adenovirus that has been 
disabled to avoid sickness. It carries sections of HIV genetic material into the body 
and has proven to trigger strong immune responses to HIV. AIDS Vaccine 
Clearinghouse reports that with reference to the current development and clinical 
trial pipeline, scientists estimate “that it will be six to ten years before the first AIDS 
vaccine is licensed for use in the United States and elsewhere in the world.”154 It 
must be added that the first generation of vaccines will not provide complete 
protection against HIV, but will rather slow or delay disease progression in people 
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who receive the vaccine prior to infection. Nevertheless, this shall not be 
underestimated in terms of slowing the spread of the disease.155  
 There remains a host of “unresolved scientific questions, ethical 
controversies, and practical barriers,”156 each of which impede the process of a 
vaccine development and can cause severe delay. Reports of new, more promising 
products can appear at all time during trials and can mount in grave decisions as to 
whether continue or stop the current trial. Safety issues may also arise and further 
postpone the whole process.157 Therefore, international initiatives, organizations and 
companies must collaborate closely and share information and new scientific 
insights. Laboratories and pharmacies must revert to their scientific responsibility 
and unique opportunities they have. For finding a vaccine, it is inescapable to focus 
on a common solution to a great health threat instead of acting independently and in 
profit-oriented competition.        
In general, it can be said that the desolate 1990s, perhaps the dark age of 
vaccine development, are over now. Today, it appears that the vaccine research 
community has changed its views and is using failure as an impetus to exclude 
certain approaches rather than giving up. Scientists acknowledge that the search for a 
vaccine has taught them much about immunology and virology. Yet, scientists 
dissociated themselves from publicly attaching too high hopes on a close vaccine 
discovery. Firmly reckoning with a quick solution to the epidemic, which even in the 
case of an effective vaccine remains an illusion, holds the great danger of decreasing 
prevention commitment. A vaccine is far from being around the corner, and the 
consequences of anticipating and reckoning with the ‘magic bullet’ could impede all 
current efforts and undertakings.  
Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry must not be mistaken for the IAVI 
or a philanthropic organization. Life-long provision and production of treatment has 
become an important and substantial part of this industry. A vaccine, an alleged ‘one-
time shot,’ could be seen as an end and, therefore, a serious threat to this industry’s 
existence and growth. Although it has been portrayed that the discovery of a vaccine 
does not automatically end the epidemic, it must be acknowledged that AIDS 
treatment has become an enormous apparatus and profitable branch of industry. As 
long as AIDS exists – and projections do not suggest an end to the disease – people 
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will be dependent on treatment. The number of those in need of ARV therapy will 
not decrease and thus guarantees secure and sustained maintenance of this branch of 
industry. Yet, the question remains whether this impetus weighs heavier than the 
scientific obstacles to create a vaccine.   
In the meantime, it might appear wiser to omit the option of a vaccine and 
focus on prevention and treatment – until the miraculous pill brings relief. 
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3. Botswana – Pioneer on the Virgin Territory of a Successful sub-Saharan 
AIDS Response 
 
Every HIV/AIDS epidemic differs from country to country, from society to society 
and from culture to culture. There is not one big epidemic, but hundreds of small 
ones. We have already found out how many different factors and influences 
determine the extent and, consequently, the prevention and treatment potential. As 
Botswana has received global attention for its pioneering position in a successful 
HIV/AIDS response, it is wise to scrutinize the country’s AIDS policy, its origins 
and what might make it possible or impossible to copy it in other countries. As every 
epidemic differs, the feasibility and efficacy of prevention and treatment strategies 
differ with it. Size of population, government determination, infrastructure, 
international support, religion, the country’s economic (in)dependence are only a 
few, but highly central determinants that both fuel or cushion the spread of the virus.  
A brief survey of Botswana’s living conditions opens the quest for the 
country’s AIDS architecture.       
 
3.1 Botswana Country Survey according to the CIA World Factbook158 
 
It is a cold and hard fact that Botswana belongs to a minority of African countries 
that could maintain a fifty-year long state of complete peace without any warlike 
interruptions. Botswana has been formerly known as the British protectorate of 
Bechuanaland. It changed its name on the 30th of September 1966, when the 
constitution of March 1965 was passed and made Botswana an independent 
parliamentary republic. The population of the country is ‘roughly estimated’ 1 639 
833 million people who are living in an area of 600 000 square meters that the World 
Factbook comparatively describes as an area slightly smaller than Texas.  
71.6% of the population are Christians, 6% are Badimo and the remaining 
22% are not religious, unspecified or not listed due to unavailable data. The country 
has a literacy rate of 82.4% female and 76.9% male who are over 15 and can read 
and write. The president’s name since April 1998 is Festus G. Mogae, who combines 
both the positions of chief of state and head of government in his office. Mogae has 
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been indirectly elected again in October 2004, which the constitution already set as 
his last term.          
Botswana is globally known for two very different things: diamonds and 
AIDS. It is a given fact that Botswana’s economy, which “has maintained one of the 
world’s highest economic growth rates since independence,” is equally driven by 
diamond mining than its population is riven by AIDS. Botswana, once firmly 
positioned among the poorest countries in the world, ascended “through fiscal 
discipline and sound management” to a middle-income country with a per capita 
GDP of US$10 000 in 2005. Apart from mineral extraction (predominantly diamond 
mining), which constitutes one third of GDP and 79-80% of export earnings, people 
work in key sectors such as tourism, financial services, subsistence farming and 
cattle raising. Yet, Botswana also has an unemployment rate of 23.8%, which is 
believed to be underrated and rather closer to 40%. Although 30.3% of the 
population are reported to live under the poverty line, the people of Botswana can 
look back to “[f]our decades of uninterrupted civilian leadership, progressive social 
policies, and significant capital investments [that] have created one of the most 
dynamic economies in Africa.” Notwithstanding, AIDS has done a lot of damage to 
these remarkable achievements. In 2003, UNAIDS shocked the world with an 
apparently overestimated HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of 37.3% – the highest in 
the world. Three years later, in 2006, UNAIDS seemed to rectify this figure, stating 
that HIV prevalence was assumed to be 24.1%.159 The death rate, 29.5 per 1000, has 
already outdone the birth rate, which is said to be 23.08 per 1000. Higher infant 
mortality and a considerably lower life expectancy that dropped from 65 years in 
1990-1995 to less than 40 years in 2000-2005 are steadily decimating the country’s 
population. 
Fortunately, one of Africa’s most progressive and comprehensive HIV/AIDS 
programmes is avoiding that the worst comes to the worst. Various joint efforts have 
been undertaken to prevent the country from a greater disaster. These mammoth 
undertakings, and prior to them, the first attempts at walking, are worth a closer look.          
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3.2 First Steps – The Gap between Intentions and Results 
 
Freeing Africa from ‘the 21st century plague’ means changing it – changing it at its 
very roots. But international intervention and assistance also means partially 
‘westernizing’ it. Botswana, with its effective government, small population and 
modern health provision could be deemed an obvious case of effective western 
prevention and intervention methods. Despite huge cultural gaps, Botswana differed 
and still differs from other African countries in that there is long peace, stable 
constitutional democracy and relative wealth. It was supposed that “if Western AIDS 
policies were capable of working anywhere in Africa they should have worked 
here.”160 And despite the still threatening situation and a lame initiation, the relative 
success of political devotion and international funding and treatment provision is 
hardly deniable. Yet, first attempts to enlighten Botswana society on HIV rather 
averted awareness and caution than raising it.  
Botswana AIDS response is often divided into three phases, the first of which 
Suzette Heald describes as the “behaviour change and condom phase.”161 In 1988, 
first attempts of mass education and introducing the condom were made that 
appeared to having done more harm than help to the people and the disease’s further 
development. International agencies, which had been brought in for advice in 1987, 
and the Botswana government had been oblivious to the people’s cultural heritage 
and identity that was said to be standing in the way of averting an impending AIDS 
crisis.162 Furthermore, hardly any evidence of morbidity or dying was to be seen 
anywhere at that time. Thus, widespread disbelief was a common reaction.163 It 
appeared that the word ‘prevention’ in prevention methods was neither understood 
nor taken seriously due to a lack of actual evidence of dying. Moreover, southern 
African sexual culture was another hurdle to get over. What had been described as 
widespread disbelief – often referred to as ‘AIDS denialism’ – can also be interpreted 
as a defense mechanism, as the promotion of condom use must be handled with 
sensitive care in certain cultures: the use of condoms was rashly connected with 
immorality and an encouragement to promiscuity in Botswana, which triggered 
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massive uproar and emotional outrage – particularly in the case of women.164 In 
contrast to a male, often well-reputed tradition of promiscuity, women had often 
been reported to be scared of appearing promiscuous themselves when asking their 
partners for using condom. Moreover, how can a wife ask her apparently 
monogamous husband for condom use without indirectly insinuating that he is not 
faithful?165 It has also been omitted that condom use has been designed and relatively 
effective in western countries where recreational sex is largely practised. Yet, 
Botswana, as many African countries, has a very strong procreational aspect in 
sexual intercourse that was standing in the way of condoms. According to Tswana 
(or Setswana) belief – with 79% the greatest ethnic group in the country – condoms 
suppress the flow of blood and connection that were widely deemed as health 
giving.166 Hence, leaders of spirit churches and traditional doctors interpreted the 
condom as disease bringing rather than disease averting. In their eyes and the eyes of 
local communities, which were not incorporated in the educational prevention effort, 
the modern state was increasingly associated with sexual laxity and disease.167 This 
stance was clearly opposed to Tswana morality. Paradoxically, it must be concluded 
that this traditional, elderly opposition, which was originally meant to avert the 
modern life disease, has actually paved its way.  
 After 1995, the majority of international donors pulled out, stating that the 
country’s wealth could well enough provide for its own AIDS programme. Lack of 
political will and the strength of stigma left Botswana’s AIDS response in a state of 
apathy, leaving huge gaps of information. Apart from the fact that no one foresaw 
such a mass dying at that time, it may be concluded that the economic power of 
Botswana – namely the diamond industry – was never put at risk by a population 
collapse, as mining was/is predominantly done by a minority.168 Moreover, society 
remained rather blind to the severity of the impending epidemic. The absence of 
procedures for recording deaths further decreased direct evidence of rising mortality, 
at least until the mid-to-late nineties.169 
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 Suzette Heald criticizes the western shaped AIDS prevention design by 
highlighting a cultural challenge that could not be met. She dares to wonder why the 
word ‘stigma’ is not publicly replaced by the word shame, emphasizing once more 
the discrepancy between Tswana beliefs and the created picture and cultural 
implications of the disease.  
But here, we are in a hall of mirrors and it is important to ask how far the ‘special’ 
status of HIV, imported by the West, with its association with ‘perverted sexuality’ and 
mandatory emphasis on confidentiality has not coalesced with indigenous ideas to 
magnify the negative aura surrounding the disease?170 
Fortunately, despite the portrayed damage, Botswana AIDS policy experienced a 
complete change in the second phase, when ARV roll-out began. Though burdened 
with a lame initiation, the country’s AIDS policy was to become an exemplary 
African success story that will now be scrutinized.  
Despite the recognition of Heald’s analyses and the legitimacy of her theses, 
it must be asked whether her neo-colonial impression of an uninfluential and 
paralyzed country which is helplessly bombarded with a western AIDS prevention 
that is predominantly doing damage is not slightly overdrawn. The issue of harmful 
international help and the danger of misconceptions will be touched upon again in 
4.5.     
 
3.3 The Blueprint of Botswana’s AIDS Programme Architecture 
 
Botswana’s AIDS programme landscape underwent a massive change in 1999/2000. 
It made the country’s response to the epidemic hardly recognizable. Botswana has 
been exclusively flooded with partnerships, NGOs and a host of various 
governmental programmes and initiatives, which have become challenging to survey 
and grasp in their entirety, function, impact and hierarchy. This dramatic experiment 
– still unique in its kind on the African continent – was meant to succeed and thus 
give heart to the rest of the world. It has transformed Botswana into “a land of 
acronyms, with a mosaic of programmes and agencies criss-crossing one another.”171 
Together they have been trying to reduce the impact the virus had on the 
approximately 265 205 and their families and friends. With a population of 1.7 
million, these 265 205 people constitute an overall HIV prevalence rate of 17.1% and 
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an adult prevalence rate of 24.1%, the second highest in the world after Swaziland.172 
Yet, according to the 2005 Botswana Antenatal (Sentinel) Surveillance Survey, the 
country’s HIV prevalence of 33.4% in women aged 15-49 years remains the highest 
in the world.173 In 2006, by the end of June, 51 000 children had been registered with 
the national orphan care programme.174 One year prior to these figures, the Botswana 
AIDS Impact Survey II (BAIS II) estimated a number of 125 233 orphaned children, 
hardly daring to speak of projections that forecast a number of 200 000 orphans by 
2010.175  
At the forefront of many of these initiatives has been Botswana President 
Festus Mogae, who emerged as a leading figure, symbol and political pioneer in the 
country’s and continent’s AIDS response. He chairs the highest level coordinating 
body, the National AIDS Council (NAC), which is mandated to advise the 
government on HIV/AIDS matters and has representatives from 17 sectors including 
civil society, the public and private sector. It is predominantly concerned with the 
Vision 2016 goals, which are guiding other initiatives and as an economic, social, 
political, cultural and spiritual blueprint seek for an AIDS free Botswana by the 50th 
anniversary of independence.176 Since 1998, the National Assembly Select 
Committee on AIDS works to ensure the priority of the AIDS fight on the 
government’s political and social agenda. A broad overview should be achieved via 
sector HIV/AIDS committees that consist of the various ministries’ HIV/AIDS 
committees and are represented by NGOs, private and development partner sectors. 
These sector committees pursue the issue of AIDS in areas such as finance, labour, 
law, ethics, trade, sports and recreation, wildlife and tourism.177 The National AIDS 
Co-ordinating Agency (NACA) works directly under the NAC and the Office of the 
President. With its broad mandate, the NACA can be described as an executive 
power in charge of facilitating programme implementation, mobilizing resources, 
strengthening institutional capacities and monitoring and evaluating programmes. 
Prevention, information, education, routine HIV testing is co-ordinated and 
implemented by the Department of AIDS Prevention and Care (DAPC), which is 
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also responsible for the country’s ARV treatment. Commissioners lead the District 
Multi-Sectoral AIDS Committees (DMSACs), which include the heads of 
decentralized departments, medical officers, NGOs and traditional authorities.178 
Last, but not least, Masa (engl. New Dawn), the country’s proud and exemplary free 
ARV treatment programme, provides therapy for all qualifying citizens that have a 
critical CD4 count, usually below 200 per millilitre.179 (Healthy, HIV-negative 
people have a CD4 count of 500-600 per millilitre.)   
 Obviously, this monstrous apparatus is a remarkable and outstanding 
demonstration of the country’s and particularly the president’s commitment. Yet, it 
provokes the critical juxtaposition of bureaucracy and efficacy. It provokes the 
question in how far the first hinders the latter. The African Comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) is not lying when considering these government 
structures as ‘essential services’. But Heald is probably not lying either in her 
evaluation of the side-effects of this tremendous bureaucratic construction. 
According to her analyses, the immediate effects were ‘turf wars’ between the 
different agencies and ministries.180 Apart from rather unquestioned stifling side-
effects of bureaucratic regulation, personnel competition could also be observed 
inside the new areas, which were criticized for seeking too similar goals.181 The great 
shortage of staff was another serious consequence of the new implementations, 
which burst Botswana’s quite well-established health care system. A 30% increase in 
doctors and an almost 200% increase in pharmacists in 2002 built a long-term 
challenge to the country. This lack of trained personnel had to be compensated by 
international agencies and triggered something Heald calls ‘the downside of 
philanthropy’: as their salaries were three to ten times higher than Botswana salaries, 
the government health provision was heavily burdened with the costs the great 
density of international employees caused.182                            
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3.4 ACHAP – Gates, Merck and the Government Spearhead the Country’s   
      Response 
 
Botswana and AIDS are hard to separate from international intervention. Botswana is 
pioneer, model and living proof for what is possible and what can be mobilized and 
achieved in African AIDS-stricken countries – with international help from giant 
foundations, large pharmaceutical companies and a stable democracy that does not 
deter international agencies, one must add. The decisiveness and commitment of the 
Mogae government have never been questioned. But neither can it be questioned that 
Botswana would look considerably more rampaged without international help. The 
second, successful phase of the Botswana AIDS response – initiated and dominated 
by the roll-out of antiretroviral medicine – is deeply entwined with western support 
and western design.  
The African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP), launched in 
2000, is a perfect example of an international collaboration. ACHAP is a public-
private development partnership between the government of Botswana, the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation and Merck & Company Incorporated/the Merck Company 
Foundation.183 And it has turned the tide of the disease tremendously. Yet, prior to 
the launch of this collaboration, activist groups and the WHO’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative 
paved the way for the treatment campaign. Additionally, the mid-term power transfer 
from President Masire to President Mogae in April 1997 can surely be deemed as a 
key date in Botswana AIDS policy – though it was not until August 1999 that Mogae 
launched a new campaign.184 After he enlisted a number of overseas partners, 
ACHAP was founded in 2001 to spearhead the country’s to date unique treatment 
programme, the aim of which was not solely humanitarian: apart from prolonging the 
lives of the infected and decrease mortality, therapy and treatment provision should 
systematically break the cycle of stigma and denial.185 The government put 
considerable efforts, hopes and resources behind the initiative, clearly aiming at a 
new openness towards the disease and, consequently, an increase in testing.186 
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After a public announcement of the partnership in July 2000, both The Bill 
and Melinda Gates and Merck Company Foundation pledged US$50 million each.187 
Additionally, Merck & Company Incorporated pledged the two ARV drugs Stocrin 
and Crixivan to the government of Botswana up to 2005.188 After the ACHAP Board 
of Directors had been appointed, an ARV strategy developed and officially approved, 
the country’s ARV programme Masa was launched by President Mogae on 1st 
December 2001. The enthusiastically envisaged aim to put at least one fifth of the 
estimated 110 000 needy people on Masa by the end of 2002 soon turned out to be 
unattainable. Yet, in 2002, the completion of 20 ARV treatment clinics and two 
laboratories could be realized that predominantly aimed at targeting pregnant women 
with AIDS, HIV-positive child in-patients, HIV-positive people with TB and adult 
in-patients with AIDS.189 Moreover in 2002, major programmes such as Teacher 
Capacity Building, Condom Social Marketing and Free Distribution and the 
Botswana HIV Response Information System were launched. Anyhow, by January 
2003, 3 200 out of the originally targeted 19 000 patients were on antiretroviral 
therapy – a great backlash for a country which first experienced that putting someone 
on treatment is a lengthy process. It has not been considered how much time 
counselling, testing, blood screening, counting the CD4 cells of the patient and 
finally enrolling him or her in the programme would actually take.190 Apart from 
that, the shortage of staff impeded the process of treatment scale-up considerably. 
The new challenges demanded more personnel, but at the same time, the epidemic 
was draining skilled people, leaving the country with the necessity to recruit people 
from poorer parts of Africa and import work forces from India and Cuba.191  
By that time, pressure mounted on the government: for the whole of southern 
Africa, Botswana served as laboratory experiment. The country’s success or failure 
would determine further proceedings of many other countries in the fight against 
AIDS. The prerequisites for success have never been that good before in any African 
country, and Botswana was already about to be publicly announced as a bad example 
that would deter foreign investors and donators. Yet, during 2003, a gradual rise in 
treatment could be observed, reaching around 8 000 people at ten clinics by the end 
of the year. Finally, reluctance and inertia of the Botswana people seemed to level 
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off in May 2004 when 24 000 people (14 000 on antiretroviral treatment) had been 
enrolled in the programme and flooded the country’s already bursting testing sites.192 
By June 2005, a respectable number of 43 000 people were partaking in the 
programme, mounting even to the latest available figure in September 2005 of 54 
378 people.193 Masa received excellent responses at that time, and the public eye was 
privileged to witness a mortality decline. At that time, Botswana was in such a 
desolate state that the burial of old people (instead of young people) brought a 
feeling of relief and returning normalcy.194     
Burdened with a high responsibility due to the country’s dependence on the 
two delivered drugs and donations, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Merck Company Foundation pledged an additional funding of US$13 million to the 
government of Botswana in late 2005.195 Another pledge of continued donation by 
Merck & Company Incorporated of Stocrin and Crixivan up to 2009 was equally 
assured.196 
Despite the great success of having put 85% of people in need of treatment on 
the ARV programme, Botswana still faces tremendous challenges. The missing 15% 
are very likely to be dying without intervention, and all of those enrolled must 
continue to receive the drugs and monitoring services until the end of their shortened 
lives. Hence, the unanswered question is: who will provide the drugs when Merck & 
Company, Incorporated decide to pull out in 2009 after nine years of drug donation? 
Moreover, people who develop resistance to their medication are dependent 
on more expensive and more complex second-line alternatives.197 Of course, Masa 
must be further decentralized to reach out to the more constrained, rural settings in 
the country. Additionally, antiretroviral treatment cannot solve Botswana’s AIDS 
crisis, when new infections are not simultaneously averted. Thus, prevention efforts, 
which the country has already been bombarded with, must be scaled up, too.198                                                        
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3.5 Why the Example of Botswana Cannot Easily Be Reproduced 
 
Botswana has surprised and impressed not only the international community, but also 
predominantly itself. The country is and remains the sub-Saharan AIDS response 
miracle, inevitably tempting neighbouring and other equally hit or poor countries to 
copy what this once doomed country has achieved. It is already proven that other 
countries are following the approach. Research presented at the conference in Rio de 
Janeiro showed that ARV treatment projects have been set up “from the scratch” in 
Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa.199 UNAIDS reports that 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people receiving ARV treatment increased 
from 100 000 in 2003 to 810 000 in 2005.200 This can surely not be traced back to the 
Botswana blueprint and rather is a sign of a modified, advanced treatment access. 
Yet, most of these increases took place in Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and, to 
the largest extent, in South Africa.  
Botswana remains the undisputed pioneer on the virgin territory of a 
successful sub-Saharan AIDS response. And this response cannot be merely reduced 
to the antiretroviral treatment campaign, which is understandably focused on most of 
the time. Botswana also distributed 6 495 300 free condoms via 1875 dispensers in 
the ten districts of the country.201 Together with Brazil and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Botswana managed to elaborate its Teacher 
Capacity Building Project for HIV/AIDS Prevention (TCB). This project aims at 
installing HIV preventive values and attitudes in teachers and students and also 
contains a distance education programme that utilizes both television and 
information technology to reduce the impact of the disease on the education sector.202 
Altogether, 137 schools have been provided with transmission equipment, and the 
installation process is still going on.  
 Taking all this to heart leaves little doubt: this country has achieved great 
things, miracles perhaps. Yet, while reflecting on the way projects have been erected, 
it dawns on us that successful AIDS responses vary culturally, economically and 
individually from case to case. The complexity of AIDS does not allow for simple 
‘repeating’ or ‘copying’. Of course, it would be foolish of similar countries to remain 
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ignorant of what succeeded in Botswana. But it certainly appears equally foolish not 
to consider the prerequisites that set the pegs for success in Botswana. In a nutshell, 
it appears legitimate to downsize the success to three key points that might be 
described as a trilateral approach recipe: domestic resources, international help and 
political commitment.  
It seems that if any of these three listed prerequisites had been missing or 
weaker, the country’s success would not have been that great, globally astounding or 
even possible. The first vital presupposition, the country’s domestic resources, 
allowed the government to pay foreign doctors, medication, domestic workers and 
install testing, counselling and treatment sites. Botswana’s almost fifty-year-long 
peace, its stable democracy as well as its large diamond industry ensured the 
country’s relative wealth and thus paved the way for the well-established health care 
infrastructure. Special testing and treatment sites had yet to be installed, of course, 
but nonetheless, Botswana’s health system was far above sub-Saharan African 
standard.  
It can surely be claimed, too, that Botswana’s special state of peace and 
democracy made things considerably easier for international donors. Of course, the 
country’s HIV prevalence rate was astonishingly high and the country’s impending 
extinction pressured the world to act. Yet, the question remains whether western 
(mostly American) donors and companies would have undertaken similar efforts in 
the case of a civil war-torn military regime with similar HIV rates. Perhaps it was 
easier or appeared more logical to prevent a country from losing its wealth than 
helping a poorer African country that has never made it so far. Anyhow, there is no 
question that the country’s peace, democracy and commitment made the decision to 
help and inevitability to intervene substantially easier – particularly as Botswana 
already provided the necessary financial and health care resources and was 
additionally threatened with complete extinction. Without the two antiretroviral 
drugs donated by the Merck & Company, Incorporated and the pledged US$50 
million from each the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Merck in 2000, things 
would look very different in Botswana today. Additional donations by UNDP, NGOs 
and PEPFAR can be deemed vital for the success of the treatment roll-out and its 
maintenance. Moreover, collaborations with Brazil and the inception of Botswana-
American partnerships pushed the efficacy of projects further ahead. BOTUSA, the 
collaboration of the Botswana government and the US Centers for Disease Control 
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and Prevention (CDC), which aimed at working on public health research and 
programmes to combat TB and AIDS, is an exemplary co-operation that is today part 
of PEPFAR.203  
Yet, this extensive international help would probably not have come into 
being without a trustworthy, committed and ambitious partner to work with: 
Botswana President Festus Mogae. His election surely marked a turning point in the 
country’s AIDS response architecture. His decisiveness and publicly demonstrated 
devotion brought the AIDS response tremendously forward and served as a role 
model for responsibility that is to remain the counterpart of many African countries, 
particularly South Africa. Mogae also became the first president to publicly admit his 
fear of being HIV-infected in June 2003. The test turned out to be negative.204 Six 
months later he backed a full HIV routine testing programme and received harsh 
criticism from human rights organizations.205 Nonetheless, he carried it through. 
Today, routine testing is believed to have massively contributed to the decrease in 
mortality, denial and stigma. 
Conclusively, to close the Botswana chapter, two conclusions can be drawn: 
first, Botswana must be learnt from. And second, a simple repetition of the Botswana 
AIDS programme will be hard or impossible for most other sub-Saharan African 
countries, as the prerequisites that paved the way for universal treatment access and 
extensive prevention in Botswana are often missing. Yet, political commitment 
appears as a magnet for international donors in the Botswana success story. Many 
international organizations are willing to act and intervene. But they will need some 
conscientious, devoted and enthusiastic political partners to work with. They will 
need leaders who demand foreign help because they want their country to change – 
and not because foreign donors and organizations want it in the first place. This must 
inevitably be the first step towards a successful and, particularly, a culturally adapted 
response. International development aid and intervention without indigenous 
collaboration bears a certain dangerous potential and can do more harm than help, as 
shown in 3.2 (also see 4.5).          
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4. South Africa – The most Affected Nation is (Not) Struggling for its 
Survival  
 
Despite the country’s abundant supply of natural resources and well-developed legal, 
financial, communication and transport sectors, HIV/AIDS is threatening the 
population, its wealth, economy and existence at the core. In 2005, 18.8% of adults 
(15-49 years) were estimated HIV-positive. In a population sized 44 million, this 
makes up an estimated 5.5 million people living with HIV, making South Africa’s 
epidemic one of the worst in the world.206 Although a few other countries may have 
more daunting HIV prevalence rates, South Africa accounts for the highest number 
of people living with the disease worldwide. Additionally, despite several recent 
increases in treatment access, there is no evidence of decline in sight yet. AIDS rates 
are expected to rise sharply until 2010, which would result in one million orphaned 
children by 2015.207  
 August 2003 surely marks a turning point in South African AIDS policy, 
when the government bowed to international and public pressure and initiated an 
extensive ARV programme.208 Currently, South Africa accounts for one quarter of all 
people receiving antiretroviral therapy in sub-Saharan Africa, with an increase from 
fewer than 5000 people at the beginning of 2004 to an astounding 190 000 by the end 
of 2005.209 Yet, despite the success, this increase leaves 800 000 of the estimated one 
million in need of antiretroviral therapy untreated.210 This also means that one 
seventh of the globally estimated seven million people in need of therapy live in the 
country South Africa.  
South Africa’s history of apartheid, the almost uniquely high number of 
people living with HIV, the steep increase in treatment roll-out, but also the 
government’s reluctant and short-sighted attitude towards ARV treatment, prevention 
and the upcoming threat to its citizens make South Africa a special case. Probably no 
other country in the world will face comparable challenges and hardship in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS and for the maintenance of its economic power and its survival.  
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A brief glimpse into the composition of the country provides the necessary 
background for the discussion and open the chapter to one of the most interesting, 
but most demanding and deterring current AIDS epidemics. South Africa’s long way 
to freedom – the transition from the repressive apartheid regime to a democratic 
system in the 1990s – will provide first answers to the belated HIV/AIDS 
intervention and the current size of the epidemic.               
 
     4.1   South Africa Country Survey according to the CIA World Factbook211 
 
South Africa has always been highly attractive for immigrants and, in some cases a 
more appropriate expression, invaders. The Dutch settlers, the Boers, were forced to 
trek north to found own republics when the British seized the Cape of Good Hope 
area in 1806. The country’s abundant natural resources were discovered early, when 
diamonds and gold were first unearthed in 1867 and 1886. The discovery of these 
great resources cannot necessarily be deemed an advantage for the country, as it 
spurred wealth, but immigration and subjugation of the country’s native inhabitants, 
too. In the attempt to resist the British encroachments, the Boers were at pains to 
defend their “own”, but were defeated in the Boer War 1899-1902. From there on, a 
policy of a separate development of the races, apartheid, reigned the Union of South 
Africa and found its end in the 1990s, when the black majority came into rule.212 
 South Africa is one of the richest countries in Africa. It shares borders with 
Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia, completely surrounds Lesotho and partially 
Swaziland. Whereas Lesotho’s HIV prevalence remains stable at high levels of 
23.2%, Swaziland is struggling with one of the highest rates in the world: 33.4%.213  
The median age of the 44 million South Africans is 24 years, with a life 
expectancy of 42.73 years and an infant mortality death rate of 60.66 deaths per 1000 
births. Currently, the general death rate of 22 deaths per 1000 is outdoing the birth 
rate of 18.2 births per 1000.  
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South Africa’s ethnicity consists of 79% black Africans, 9.6% whites and 
8.9% coloured, i.e. predominantly Indians. The country has a great religious 
diversity, which consisits of 11.1% Zion Christians, 8.2% Pentecostal/Charismatics, 
7.1% Catholics, 6.8% Methodists, 6.7% Dutch Reformed, 3.8% Anglicans, 1.5% 
Muslims and 36% other Christians. South Africa’s languages appear equally 
manifold: 23.8% speak IsiZulu, 17.6% IsiXhosa, 13.3% Afrikaans, 9.4% Sepedi, 
8.2% English, 8.2% Setswana and 7.9% speak Sesotho. The diversity in language, 
ethnicity and religion has made the design and implementation of standardized 
prevention programmes very difficult. The literacy rate, which by definition includes 
those who are over 15 and can read and write, is 86.4%.  
 South Africa’s official, administrative capital is Pretoria, though Cape Town 
can be referred to as the legislative capital and Bloemfontein is known as the judicial 
capital. Although South Africa became independent from the UK in 1910, it was not 
until 1961 that the country became a republic, following a referendum in 1960. The 
current constitution, certified by the Constitutional Court, was signed by then 
President Nelson R. Mandela on 10 December 1996 and has been implemented in 
phases. Since June 1999, Nelson’s former deputy, Thabo Mbeki, is both chief of state 
and head of government and will not be eligible for a third term after his re-election 
in 2004 by a 100% vote of the National Assembly. His party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), originated in 1912 and was founded on the democratic principles 
of its 1959 Freedom Charter. After the oppressive white minority regime, the 
National Party (NP), had forbidden the ANC in 1960, it reverted to a rather symbolic, 
armed liberation struggle.214  
The end of the Cold War and the decolonization of Namibia in 1989, inner 
economic problems and international sanctions forced then President Frederik 
Willem de Klerk to release political prisoners and legalize their parties again.215 In 
1990, ANC and NP agreed upon a new political order that would set an end to the 
46-year-long European induced racial segregation and economic exploitation of 
South Africa. The following transition took place in a climate of politicized ethnicity 
and violence.216 A truth commission (1996-98) was supposed to provide 
reconciliation with the country’s bitter past. In the 2004 elections, 69.7% voted for 
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the ANC, providing them with 279 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly. The 
NP withdrew from the political landscape in 1996, when it became obvious that the 
party’s reputation as an heir to the apartheid regime became increasingly 
disadvantageous.217 Its reformation, the New National Party (NNP), has been equally 
unsuccessful in the last elections and only made up 1.7% (7 seats). Since 1997, 
another populist alternative is the Unity Democracy Movement (UDM), which only 
2.3% voted for in the last elections.  
 Economically, South Africa has rich supplies in natural resources, which 
makes it the world’s largest producer of gold, platinum and chromium. Well-
developed financial, communication, transport and energy sectors as well as a 
modern infrastructure ensure an extensive delivery of goods. South Africa’s stock 
exchange ranks among the ten largest in the world. Yet, an unemployment rate of 
26.6% and a lack of economic empowerment of disadvantaged groups as a heritage 
from the apartheid era weigh heavily on the country. A big transnational issue 
relevant to the HIV/AIDS crisis is the trafficking of men, women and children for the 
sake of forced labour and sexual exploitation. Both are oil in the fire of the disease 
and its spread. South Africa serves as source, transit and destination country, 
trafficking women and girls internally as well as on to European and Asian countries. 
The country has been criticized for its failure to address this problem successfully.          
                                          
 4.2   AIDS Policy in South Africa: A Short History of Long Mismanagement      
      
“The history of AIDS policy in South Africa is a sorry tale of missed opportunities, 
inadequate analysis, bureaucratic failure and political mismanagement,”218 Nicoli 
Nattrass writes in her book The Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa. In fact, it is 
hardly deniable that the country’s recent success of increased antiretroviral treatment 
access from 5000 in 2004 to 190 000 in 2005 is ambivalent: on the one hand, it is a 
highly welcome development that the government achieved this tremendous 
increase. Yet, on the other hand – and this refers to the Nattrass quote – it is alarming 
that the country with the world’s biggest population of people living with HIV/AIDS 
dares to delay its provision of treatment to such extents. Of course, every success in 
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the provision of therapy simultaneously raises the question of why it had not been 
possible earlier. Yet, in the particular case of South Africa, this is different.  
 As already outlined in the country survey, South Africa’s turbulent past and 
transitional political landscape played a major role in the further development and 
spread of the virus. The virus literally hit its host when it was mostly distracted and 
inattentive. South Africa’s political circumstances hardly allowed for an adequate 
response to a newly evolving disease, the extent of which was not yet foreseeable. 
Hence, it was not until the 1990s that HIV/AIDS was paid increasing attention – 
more than eight years after the first case was diagnosed in 1982.219 As described in 
several other epidemics, too, the disease slowly left the homosexual framework and 
crossed over into the heterosexual field. In 1990, it was estimated that 74 000-120 
000 people were living with HIV/AIDS. One year later, when the number of actually 
diagnosed heterosexual HIV cases equalled the number of homosexual ones, it 
slowly dawned on health professionals and politicians what future direction the 
epidemic would take.220 The fact that the apartheid government’s attempts to 
promote condom use were not undertaken until the diagnosis of the first heterosexual 
HIV case was interpreted as racist and politically motivated due to prejudices against 
homosexuals and the support for Calvinistic morality and prudishness.221 Apart from 
that, it was stated that even a committed AIDS plan would have been doomed, as the 
de Klerk government was devoid of any credibility or legitimacy among South 
Africa’s black population.222 Nevertheless, several AIDS information, training and 
counselling centres as well as a free National AIDS Helpline were installed until 
1992. Unfortunately, these interventions did not suffice to prevent a further increase 
by 60% in 1993.223 Also Nelson Mandela’s addressing the National AIDS 
Committee of South Africa (NACOSA) in 1992, the educative Soul City prevention 
programme, founded in 1994, or the International Conference for People Living with 
HIV/AIDS held in South Africa in 1995 could not halt or reverse the epidemic. On 
the contrary: the HIV prevalence rate among pregnant women rose from 12.2% in 
1996 to 17.7% in 1997.224 In the following year, the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) was born from missing political leadership to substitute government action 
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and constitute a public voice for the afflicted. Later that year, then Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki launched the Partnership Against AIDS and stated publicly that 1500 
HIV infections occurred in South Africa on a daily basis.225 
 It should be noted that NACOSA’s AIDS plan, developed in September 1993, 
was reported to be comprehensive and progressive, embracing sexual rights of 
women and involving infected people in AIDS policy development. Even a multi-
sectoral structure with implementing units in key ministries such as health, welfare, 
education and defense was earmarked.226 Unfortunately, political activists and trade 
unionists responded poorly to the initiatives, predominantly due to “political and 
organizational imperatives (that) effectively marginalized the AIDS agenda.”227 The 
national and international media was fixed on a historic social and political upheaval 
that hardly provided space for the combat of a disease which appeared less important 
than ethnic liberation. In the meanwhile, AIDS sneaked in the distracted new 
country, already planning to haunt the predominant black population with the next 
plague. In 1999, HIV prevalence among pregnant women who attended antenatal 
clinics rose to 22.4% and increased further before culminating in 2005 to 30.2%.228  
 Although South Africa’s eleven official languages and various dialects 
massively impeded prevention, there were also other problems at hand. Sparsely 
populated rural areas lacked infrastructure and stood in the way of awareness 
campaigns.229 Moreover, despite the welcome fact that the new ANC government 
quickly adopted the Committee’s AIDS Plan in 1994, their failure was described as 
allocating responsibility to the health ministry rather than the president’s office. 
According to Nattrass, this made AIDS a health problem instead of a social problem, 
thus “limiting the potential for a multi-sectoral co-ordinated response.”230 
Furthermore, the new government was occupied with bureaucratic restructuring. The 
so-called ‘independent Bantustans’ and ‘homelands’ – inherited from the old 
apartheid regime – were absorbed into nine self-governing provinces with own 
financial capacities.231 Yet, despite the legitimacy of this burden, Nattrass argues that 
after a few years, these excuses for an insufficient response are “increasingly 
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tired.”232 In October 1998, South African health minister Dlamini-Zuma denied 
antiretroviral Zidovudine to infected pregnant mothers and announced that all 
planned pilot projects be discontinued.233 This happened on the grounds that she 
considered treatment unaffordable and ineffective for the fight against the epidemic. 
This assumption is oblivious to the fact that medical and social researchers proved 
that paediatric costs of HIV-infected children offset those of mother-to-child 
transmission prevention (MTCTP).234 Unfortunately, it appears that there is a major 
mistake in logic: it might be true and proven that treating opportunistic infections of 
HIV-infected babies and children is more expensive than a short antiretroviral 
regimen of MTCTP. Yet, this logic is based on the assumption that the government 
would actually treat the opportunistic infections. But at that stage, the government 
did not appear to be willing to pay for any kind of antiretrovirals due to affordability 
problems and scientific doubts.  
 In 2001, the HIV prevalence rate of pregnant women who consulted antenatal 
clinics was 24.8%, and the government still refused to provide antiretrovirals for 
MTCTP.235 At that stage, TAC decided to take the government to court. Their goal 
was to reach a court ruling that made government provision of nevirapine to pregnant 
HIV-infected mothers mandatory and available in all state hospitals and clinics.236 
Nevirapine had been proven effective and economic in minimizing HIV transmission 
to babies. A few doctors had already started to contact NGOs to ask for provision of 
nevirapine due to government reluctance. The government continued arguing that 
nevirapine poses still unanswered questions of toxicity but was ruled against in 
favour of TAC.237  
 Despite the constitutional court ruling, the government remained rather 
hesitant about treatment access and did not approve a plan to make antiretrovirals 
publicly available until 2003. In mid-2003, MTCTP roll-out was criticized as 
‘chaotic’ by the South African newspaper Mail & Guardian, which wrote that it was 
only doing well in Western Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal.238                                                                     
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4.3 The South African Government: Secret Ally of the Virus? 
 
In retrospect, every epidemic and its respective response contains a lot of mistakes, 
miscalculations, wrong predictions and analyses. Yet, the way the South African 
government reacted to a clearly rising and increasingly threatening disease must 
leave outsiders puzzled and bewildered. It has been frequently reiterated that South 
Africa was heavily occupied with the political transition and social upheaval, with 
the formation of a democratic and ‘more’ just state and the restructuring of the old 
apartheid system’s bureaucracy. Yet, these challenges and burden underlie a certain 
time limit and cannot be used or abused as eternal excuses. The South African 
government acted with an intransigence and resistance that make one wonder 
whether state officials were at all interested in fighting the virus. The excuse of 
bureaucratic restructuring was followed by a long discourse of unaffordability, which 
then burst into a debate over poverty and toxicity of antiretrovirals and eventually 
culminated in the last and most embarrassing resort: AIDS denialism.239 Moreover, 
misleading governmental treatment advice and a publicly demonstrated lack of 
compassion, relevance and responsibility rubbed additional salt into the wounds of 
those infected or affected. 
 
 4.3.1    Delay, Defiance, Denial   
  
The first act of miscalculation is described as ‘the Sarafina II scandal’. In 1995, the 
government pursued the idea to implant a distinct anti-AIDS message in the popular 
film musical. The first problem was that considerable European Union funds were 
used for the project, which later were not permitted for this kind of prevention.240 
Apart from that, AIDS experts had not been consulted and the script was panned as 
“confused and irrelevant.”241 Sarafina II resulted in a public outcry and was reported 
to have done immense damage to the government, which later cited it as one of 
ANC’s key mistakes of the year.242 
 The next rather short-sighted ambition was an illegal testing trial of the 
alleged AIDS treatment Virodene in February 1997. Already burdened with the 
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reputation of having proved toxic and inefficient in earlier trials for cancer therapy, 
Virodene was tested in HIV infected patients without adherence to ethical and 
scientific obligations.243 The result was no treatment, falsely raised hopes and the 
dismissal of the chairperson of the Medicines Control Council (MCC), who was 
removed by the government because the Council kept refusing the drug.244  
Yet, the controversy did not abate and more material for public indignation 
and fury was to be delivered soon. The president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, has 
frequently been criticized for giving AIDS not enough room in his speeches that 
never showed much compassion.245 But worse, after he had been accused of 
questioning the relation between HIV and AIDS, he consulted a group of scientists 
who backed the denial. In 2000, Mbeki invited a number of so-called ‘AIDS 
dissidents’ – like famous American controversial scientist Peter Duesberg – to a 
committee that was supposed to advise the government on further proceedings in the 
AIDS crisis.246 One year later, Mbeki’s statement that HIV is not wholly responsible 
for AIDS made a large number of delegates walk out the International AIDS 
Conference in Durban.  
Equally astounding is health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who was 
assigned after the election in 1999. She continually emphasized her distrust of 
antiretrovirals and, instead, kept advising a diet high in lemon, olive oil, garlic, 
beetroot and the African potato.247 Moreover, she has frequently supported the Dr 
Rath Health Foundation, which deals in vitamin supplements as a substitute for ARV 
drugs and advertise that antiretrovirals are toxic and cause AIDS.248 In January 2003, 
Tshabalala-Msimang invited prominent AIDS denialist Robert Giraldo to address the 
Southern African Development Community Ministerial Health Committee. Giraldo 
stated that heterosexual transmission of AIDS is a myth devoid of any scientific 
validation.249 As a consequence, he was asked to advise the government on nutrition.  
In August 2003, relief was brought to every scientist, activist and person 
living with HIV/AIDS, when the government stated that antiretrovirals help improve 
the patient’s health at a certain stage of the disease. It is hardly worth mentioning 
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how essentially the disease in South Africa was able to evolve during the age of 
denial that gave the epidemic a tremendous lead. In South Africa, TAC staged a 
demonstration after a prisoner’s death, who died of HIV/AIDS due to a lack of 
antiretrovirals that the government denied to prisons. TAC demanded the arrest and 
investigation of Tshabalala-Msimang for causing unnecessary and preventable 
deaths.250 But also international reactions and consternation over the president’s and 
health minister’s standpoints and dubious connections as well as their lack of 
commitment and action were massive. In September 2006, 81 acclaimed scientists – 
including the co-discoverer of HIV as a cause of AIDS and Nobel laureate David 
Baltimore – wrote an open letter to Mbeki, calling for the health minister’s dismissal. 
The letter voiced concern over the minister’s views, which were causing confusion 
and impeded the country’s prevention efforts. The scientists claimed that 500 000 
people were desperately in need of antiretrovirals and called for an end to the 
‘“pseudo-scientific views’” and “‘ineffective, immoral policies on HIV/AIDS.’”251 
Stephen Lewis, the UNAIDS envoy to Africa, complained massively about the 
country’s unwillingness to collaborate and criticized the government for still being 
‘“obtuse, dilatory and negligent for rolling out treatment.’”252 His speech on the XVI 
International AIDS Conference in Toronto was perceived as “one of the most 
extraordinary and damning speeches ever made by a UN official.”253 Yet, the South 
African government claims that its roll-out programme is currently the largest in the 
world.  
 
4.3.2    Calculating Life: Economics Rule the Treatment Discourse  
          
South Africa has a long history of treatment denial. In 2001, the public amplified its 
demand for the provision of Zidovudine for MTCTP. The government reacted by 
starting a discourse of unaffordability that was ended by the court ruling in favour of 
the prosecutor TAC. Nicoli Nattrass brought up a highly embarrassing and awkward 
hypothesis for the government’s refusal to treat HIV-infected pregnant mothers. 
According to her views, the roll-out of MTCTP treatment would result in double 
costs for the government: firstly, the price for the medicine itself, including 
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counselling, screening, administration and transport and, secondly, the state-care 
costs for the saved HIV-negative orphan.254 As the mother would only receive a short 
regimen of therapy and no lifelong treatment, she would eventually die and leave an 
orphan. Conclusively, there are two options to reduce the high number of orphans: 
either, the government provides both MTCTP treatment and antiretrovirals for the 
mother after the birth of an HIV-negative child (which it did not), or it neither treats 
the mother nor the HIV-positive child, thus reducing the number of orphans. Yet, 
according to Nattrass, HIV-positive children or orphans consume a lot of state-care 
resources without the probability or ability to become decent taxpayers, financing 
these expenditures in return.255 In other words, not treating HIV-positive, pregnant 
mothers and, thus, permitting the birth of potentially HIV-positive children is not 
only morally unacceptable, but also economically disadvantageous. The mere, 
though unproved hypothesis of a government that consciously lets children be HIV-
infected due to economic (mis)calculations is truly discomforting.  
The fact that AIDS activists and professors of Economics and Social Science, 
like Nicoli Nattrass, must come down to do calculations for the government to prove 
that fighting AIDS pays off economically shows the true face of South African AIDS 
policy until the turning point in 2004/2005. The mere fact that privately done 
economic considerations are necessary to save the lives of AIDS-threatened, unborn 
children is a proof for the desolate state of the country’s AIDS policy and activism at 
that stage. In 2001, a South African newspaper, the Mail & Guardian, polemically 
wrote that the government “‘should not be surprised to hear charges of genocide 
directed against it.”’256  
This and the previous sub-chapter contain a host of implications. On the one 
hand, the question appears whether decades of living under the fascist apartheid 
regime has also had some effect on the new government and its commitment to its 
people. On the other hand, the Botswana Chapter has proven the importance of 
political commitment and the dependence of presidents’ and the respective 
ministries’ will and devotion to a successful response. While the Botswana President, 
Festus Mogae, has become a key figure in the fight against HIV/AIDS on the entire 
continent, the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, has become a symbol of a 
cold-hearted, economic AIDS policy and denialism; a person who has to be 
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‘persuaded’ by the high court to provide treatment. This and Mbeki’s dubious 
standpoints on poverty, toxicity, unaffordability, effectiveness and denialism led to 
the domestic as well as international impression that the South African president and 
government do not want to solve the problem. Ignorance towards the Botswana 
neighbour and a complete lack of compassion and far-sightedness underline this 
impression and have stolen years in the successful fight against the disease that still 
threatens South Africa more than any other country in the world.       
 
4.4 Cultural Prerequisites for the Epidemic’s Spread   
 
4.4.1 The Economy of Sex 
 
The meaning of sex in various African cultures is reminiscent of racial stereotypes 
inherited from the colonial era; the picture of an animal-like, black African male that 
knows no moral or normative boundaries to his sex drive: faithless, promiscuous, 
unchristianized, uncivilized – the latter being understood as the logical consequence 
of the one before. The thesis exists that colonialists, missionaries and modernizers, or 
people with similar sentiments, consider HIV/AIDS a kind of expected punishment – 
for centuries and decades of resistance to western ethics, religion and all ingredients 
that made western culture superior.  
The modern age brought AIDS to western nations; the disease and its spread a 
product of mobility, permissive, liberalized society and persistently changing 
morality. But simultaneously, it brought new body concepts of self-responsibility, 
intended and calculated family planning and the differentiation between fertility and 
sexual recreation along with it.257 Africa was left naked in the face of such 
challenges. In contrast to Africa, established democratic governments in Europe and 
the United States were willing and capable to launch effective campaigns without the 
inevitability of breaking traditions or taboos and introducing new scientific thought, 
which was already integrated and renowned in western societies.           
 Mbeki – despite his unscientific statements – was right in emphasizing the 
relationship between poverty and HIV/AIDS. Poverty triggers AIDS and AIDS 
triggers poverty – a dangerous and devastating vicious circle by definition. The 
disease is consequence and cause of poverty at the same time, making the breaking-
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down of this downward spiral highly complicated. Many answers have already been 
given to the omnipresent question: why has Africa been hit so severely? Roots of 
slavery and colonialism, sustained civil and military conflict, geographic 
disadvantage, patterns of migration, poor governance and structural adjustment – 
reasons and causes that seem familiar to us (they have already been enumerated 
before in the sub-Saharan chapter).258 South Africa, as a defined labour destination, 
is additionally burdened with intense migration. There also is an unproven, but well 
possible thesis on the aggressive HIV-1C virus in Africa that haunts the continent 
more destructively than the European and American HIV-1B virus due to its higher 
infectiousness and replicative rate.259 
Yet, HIV is predominantly transmitted via heterosexual sex in Africa. And 
sex has taken an involuntary position in African society that is closely linked to 
miserable living conditions and sheer survival. The economy of sex – an expression 
that would be understood as pornography and prostitution here – is a wider and 
integrated concept in African societies that rather remains beyond western 
imagination. Sex is a currency in certain cultures by means of which African women 
are expected to pay with for crossing a border, obtaining a trading license or even 
passing a grade in school.260 Desperate living conditions leave women with no other 
choice than using sex as a trading currency. This inevitability of sexual favours has 
been given the name ‘survival sex’. During the Zambian famine in 2002, women 
were charging two dollars for sex with a condom and four dollars for sex without a 
condom. Although these women were reported to be educated about HIV/AIDS, they 
said that they rather prefer dying of the virus than of hunger.261 But also outside the 
framework of survival sex, there is a large sexual culture of trading sex for fashion 
accessories, invitations to dine at restaurants or the opportunity to ride in luxury cars 
or sleep in hotels.262 The Nigerian saying ‘There is no romance without finance’ 
hints at a certain mutuality. Women are expected to pay with sex. But men are 
equally expected to provide money and gifts in return. Without passing any 
judgement of these practices that undoubtedly derive from massive gender 
inequality, it must be said that this accelerates the pandemic and the spread of STIs 
exceedingly. Mainly in East Africa, risky sexual practices such as widow inheritance, 
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widow ‘cleansing’, wife sharing and exchanging for land or cattle, polygamy and 
female circumcision push the pandemic ahead. In Southern Africa, culturally 
established gender inequality, sexual violence, a preference for dry sex, fatalistic 
attitudes and pressures to prove fertility create this high-risk environment.263  
Although it is always a combination of factors that make a disease thrive, 
these cultural prerequisites can, to a great extent, explain the past development of the 
disease in South Africa and, simultaneously, predict its future. (South) African 
sexual culture is so highly predestined for an extensive spread of HIV/AIDS that 
western intervention programmers were left with no other choice than saying: your 
culture must be transformed. 
 
4.4.2 The Colonial Legacy  
 
Africa is suffering from HIV/AIDS like no other continent. Relentlessly it is reported 
how devastating the social consequences lay their shadow over the continent’s 
economy, demography, life expectancy and social integrity. Yet, there are also theses 
which claim that HIV/AIDS itself is a social consequence – one that can be traced 
back to Africa’s unique history of foreign influence and settlement, neutrally 
speaking. The countries of Africa – and South Africa in particular – are historically 
burdened with something Whiteside and Barnett refer to as ‘abnormal normality’.  
It differs from all other regions of the world in the sustained nature of disruption, 
exploitation and bad government – and the fact that Africans, in contrast to the 
indigenous populations of other world regions, have survived these experiences.264 
It is relatively clear what is referred to in this context: colonialism and the effects it 
had on providing prerequisites for the current AIDS flow. The complexity of this 
issue is high, of course – too high to be fully scrutinized and discussed. But this is 
neither necessary nor that simple, as the controversy of the benefit/damage of the 
colonial heritage is still unabating. While the sixties, seventies and eighties merely 
highlighted the negative effects of colonialism, the nineties shed a different, more 
positive light on this era.265 Since the 1990s, it has also been argued that colonialism 
erected basic infrastructure, expanded the educational sector and improved the health 
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care system, which considerably contributed to the reduction of the overall mortality 
rate.266 Yet, it remains debatable whether these achievements outweigh the damage. 
Traditional political and administrative systems were abolished. Indirect rule either 
discredited the antecedent leaders by involving them or triggered conflict between 
various ethnicities. Colonial leaders publicly appeared as oppressors, controllers and 
exploiters, thus shaping African future governance in the post-colonial period.267 
Apart from the general damage of violent punishment, constant disparagement and 
demonstrated cultural supremacy, de-colonization was also reported to be another 
very painful and challenging period for the colonized countries (see the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo).   
 South Africa undoubtedly carries the heaviest historical and immanent burden 
of European colonization, oppression and exploitation. The discovery of diamonds 
and gold in 1867 and 1886 resulted in white immigration increase and black labour 
‘import’.268 While Europeans successfully exploited the country’s inner wealth, 
massive labour migration left its traces on sub-Saharan culture and tradition. The 
social structure experienced great transition. Labour migration, which reached its 
peak of 1.8 million in 1985, in combination with the crowded, impoverished 
homelands, led to a further breakdown of traditional cultural structures and 
livelihoods.269 The prohibition to bring wife and children into working towns further 
ruined family structures and “created a culture of urban and rural wives and of sexual 
liaisons spanning the continuum from ‘town wife’ to ‘prostitute’.”270 As a result, 
children had to be cared for by others than their original parents, which led to family 
break-ups, and vice-versa, and also resulted in a large number of untreated STIs. On 
the one hand, these transitions could be described as inevitable side-effects of 
industrialization and modern age. But on the other hand, the apartheid regime left 
South African workers without rights, value and an adequate share in their mineral 
resources.  
Gronemeyer brings up the thesis that Africa has experienced only the dark 
side, the sacrifices of modern age without ever getting in the position to take benefit 
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from it.271 Along with several others, he argues that colonialism, missionary work, 
conversion, development aid, including western prevention programmes and 
biomedical health concepts, have predominantly done harm to Africa.272                    
 
4.5 Excursus: Tradition and Death or Modernism and Survival - The 
Controversy over Western Intervention in (South) Africa 
 
The colonies were dissolved in the 1950s and 1960s. Now Africa is again exposed to 
western influence in the design of health and body concepts, doctors, nurses, helpers 
as well as exploiters, who all transport the spirit of the modern age to Africa – 
willingly or unwillingly. It appears to be paranoid to isolate Africa from everything 
that is modern or western. But the situation in Africa is grave. Democracies and the 
public see themselves obliged to act and intervene – partly because they have a bad 
conscience (due to slavery, colonial or current exploitation), partly because they feel 
a moral responsibility, compassion and a sense of massive global inequality. Yet, 
somewhere amidst the consternation and screams for help and intervention, there are 
also people who see western prevention in Africa as a new attempt on what 
colonialists, missionaries and development aid workers have left of Africa’s 
traditional culture. One of these advocates is Reimer Gronemeyer, professor for 
theology and sociology in Germany and well-travelled African AIDS expert. In his 
polemical treatise (germ. Streitschrift), which was published before the major 
increase in treatment access changed the scenery in 2004/05, he asks the question 
why western prevention bombardment leaves Africa with almost no effect.273 
Moreover, he states that the cultural damage massively outweighs the benefit.274  
 It has already been mentioned that HIV/AIDS responses in Europe and the 
USA did not have to introduce scientific and biomedical concepts into societies. 
Perhaps it can be said that there was no considerable dissonance between the 
situation and the kind of response. Scientific explanations, biomedical solutions (i.e. 
treatment, prevention) and modern body concepts of self-responsible care for one’s 
own body seemed congruent with these societies’ culture. These concepts – others 
were neither available nor proven effective – have also been used in Africa. And 
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apparently, they failed. Gronemeyer and others do not generally object to 
development aid from western nations. Yet, they demand concepts be sensibly and 
sensitively adapted to the respective culture – to be both effective and harmless.275  
 This thesis is profoundly supported: it is argued that the western prevention 
methods are based on willingness and capability of body control and self-
surveillance.276 This imperative has become a constant companion in modern 
societies, which can thus fend off an equally threatening AIDS crisis. Gronemeyer 
proclaims that the coldness of modern civilian living conditions, i.e. calculated 
family planning and constant self-surveillance, has not yet found its way to African 
societies. Unfortunately, the erosion of traditions, increase in mobility and labour 
migration provide a fertile ground for a high-risk environment that makes such 
concepts helpful and vital. Medical approaches, which are well-reputed and firmly 
positioned in western societies, can impossibly work in a country like South Africa 
that has not yet unanimously answered the question of the virus’ origin. Traditional 
stands that exclude scientific explanation models are not rare and widely accepted. 
The theses that AIDS is either a call of the ancients, connected with witchery or a 
punishable act for the neglect of vital rituals are common.277 Assumptions like these 
harden the attitude of AIDS specialists and others that traditional African views and 
explanation models are dangerous and have to be sacrificed for the sake of survival. 
Assumptions like these also further western supremacist views, inherited from the 
colonial and missionary period, which see Africa as inferior and needy and Africans 
as victims – apparently of themselves.278  
Gronemeyer realizes with regret that the AIDS crises on the continent are 
ideal to finally forget and cover the wealth of African culture and tradition. These are 
now seen as a great prevention barrier that must be overcome in order to offer 
survival. A strongly scientific conception of the world is said to be laid over Africa – 
a cocktail of biomedical, rationalistic, hygienic and prevention-oriented ingredients, 
which discredits traditional black behaviour and thinking and diagnoses everything 
African as self-endangering.279 Polemically, Gronemeyer describes these doctors as 
‘health veterans’, who claim a monopoly on ratio, truth and rightness. And as ratio 
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and rightness are already assigned to them, irrationality must logically be ascribed to 
Africans. 
Two important aspects are brought forward to support this criticism: on the 
one hand, it is described that what appears as fatalism to us might also be a hidden 
strength and concept of self-healing and coping, something that Gronemeyer 
describes as ‘stream of life’, long forsaken in European societies.280 He highlights the 
African ability to care for family members, to provide homes for orphans at relatives, 
to share food and room, no matter how scarce they might be, and to provide a funeral 
dish under the most difficult of imaginable circumstances.281 He argues that this 
power and traditional coping mechanisms are undermined when western health care 
professionals install home-based care programmes. These intervention methods are 
better, more efficient and can secure survival. But these methods also penetrate into 
the area of unspectacular, traditional African methods, and make them dubious and 
obsolete. A great desire for these better methods is being aroused. But it cannot be 
stilled.282 
This example illustrates how sheer good will, a lack of cultural knowledge 
and consciousness as well as unreflected help can cause more damage than good. It 
shows that actual help bears a logic of its own that does not necessarily appear at 
once. A supremacist stance might overestimate western-proven methods and cover 
the view for subliminal African strengths. Nevertheless, it must be critically asked, if 
the expression ‘stream of life’ adequately reflects the hardship affected and infected 
people are facing in Africa, despite a strong community ethos.  
Conclusively, it remains questionable whether western influence is so strong 
that it has the power to eliminate African culture, its languages, medical approaches, 
musical and philosophical riches, as Gronemeyer vividly envisions.283 It also remains 
questionable whether every doctor, nurse and development aid worker seeks and 
succeeds to continue what missionaries and colonialists started: the slow but steady 
infiltration of African culture and initiation of a modern life style. If Africa is so 
much stronger and self-responsible than the people think whom Gronemeyer 
criticizes so severely, then why does he not attach Africa the ability to cope with 
these influences, too? Perhaps the hidden strengths and self-healing concepts are 
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stronger and western influence weaker than Gronemeyer thinks? Additionally, the 
question remains unanswered whether missionary work and christianization did not 
have a beneficial effect in the fight against HIV/AIDS in terms of faith, too – despite 
the controversial stance on condoms of the Catholic Church. Moreover, there is a 
huge rift in his argumentation line: it does not include those who carefully and in 
respect for culture and otherness adapt their concepts to the respective condition. 
These people also exist. And his generalizations and warnings of a new breed of 
missionaries disguised as doctors and aid workers are not doing justice to them. On 
the contrary, even with bearing in mind that his book is a polemical treatise, 
Gronemeyer’s generalizations appear limited, often unfounded and unqualified – 
despite his apparently good intentions.                      
 A conclusive, diplomatic high wire act closes the sub-chapter: development 
aid is never generally good or bad. Governmental and public attempts to reduce 
poverty, disease and inequality must be undertaken – but on the imperative pre-
condition of respect and knowledge of the respective cultural and social 
circumstances.          
   
4.6    Prevention 
 
In Germany, approximately 2500 people became newly infected with HIV in 2006. 
This is the highest prevalence rate in a decade.284 Over half of the infected are 
reported to be either homosexual or injecting drug users. On average, this equates to 
seven HIV incidences a day – out of estimated 13 000 global daily infections. In 
South Africa, the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS in 2006 is reported to 
be around five million. This number is approximately 100 times higher than it is in 
Germany, where 50 000 people are reported to live with the virus – and South Africa 
still has 37 million inhabitants less. 
 These threatening figures make far greater prevention efforts necessary and 
indispensable. Although the trend in HIV prevalence is classified as ‘increasing’ by 
UNAIDS, who also state that “South Africa’s prevention efforts have not made 
notable inroads against the epidemic,”285 South Africa’s national HIV prevention 
programme for young people, LoveLife, is worth a closer look.      
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4.6.1 LoveLife – South Africa’s National Prevention Programme for Youth   
 
UNAIDS described the number of newly infected young people (aged 15 to 24) in 
2005 as ‘high’ and equal to 2003.286 Currently, incidence rates for male youth were 
reported to be 0.6% compared to 6.5% females, making up a total of 179 693 male 
youth and 815 000 female youth living with HIV/AIDS in 2005.287 
 Launched in September 1999, LoveLife seeks to establish a new model for 
effective HIV prevention and aims at reducing the HIV infection rate, teenage 
pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections among young South Africans.288 The 
programme has brought together a broad coalition of international foundations 
working in HIV prevention. Among them are major South African media 
organizations and private corporations, the government of South Africa and leading 
South African NGOs.289 According to the programme’s self-description, LoveLife 
pursues and employs three key components:  
Firstly, there are innovative nationwide media campaigns. This includes 
youth-focused television and radio programming, a monthly youth magazine and 
billboards that attempt to link young South Africans to clinical services and 
counselling. This component is founded on acknowledgements that youth 
consumption of radio and television by far exceeds that of newspapers or other media 
channels. During the last years, the internet has been increasingly frequented, too, 
due to the fact that the new democracy led to greater exposure to global influence as 
well as a rising perception of global opportunities.290  
Secondly, LoveLife pursues a face-to-face outreach service, which includes a 
network of youth centres that provide prevention services as well as health services 
in public clinics. 130 community-based organizations, known as LoveLife franchise 
holders, support the programme.  
Thirdly, a monitoring and evaluation programme shall secure the 
programme’s impact and results. A series of household surveys tracked by young 
volunteers, an in-depth assessment of the impact of youth centres and an overall 
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Monitoring and Quality Assurance seek feedback and control the programme’s 
efficiency.291 LoveLife’s concept of combining multi-media campaigns with 
nationwide community-level outreach and support programmes for youth is 
implemented by a national youth volunteer service corps known as 
‘groundBREAKERS’. They work together with around 130 community-based 
NGOs, 3700 schools and 350 government clinics across South Africa. The greatest 
share in funding is provided by the government and the Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation. The Anglo American Chairman’s Fund, Independent Newspapers, the 
National Lottery and several more provide other financing and donations.292 
 The youth programme’s concept is indeed presenting itself as a young, 
vibrant, spirited and authentic part of popular youth culture. But this is intended, 
precisely calculated and well founded. Prior to the programme’s conception, an 
analysis and survey of youth feelings, fears and views on sex, education, future 
perspectives, family values and priorities were made to successfully mirror youth 
culture, “tap in” to it and become a firmly situated part of it.293 Young people were 
reported to be ‘turned off’ by traditional ABC prevention (Abstain, Be faithful, 
Condomize) and also the red AIDS ribbon that they merely associate with death and 
disease, but not responsibility, acceptance or any kind of optimism. Consequently, it 
has been concluded that a youth programme must be substantially different from 
conventional prevention concepts. As it has been found out that young people do not 
like to be sheer recipients of a certain message, but rather want to create meaning for 
themselves, LoveLife reflects young people as ambitious, independent and 
expressive. As it has been found out that young South Africans are mostly proud of 
their background, family and country, LoveLife was designed to represent youth as 
proud of their heritage and their spirit. As it has been found out that young people 
mostly detest hypocrisy and inequality, LoveLife has created an image of honesty, 
trust and mutual respect.294 LoveLife seeks a concept that can compete with brands 
such as Nike, Diesel and Coca Cola, which young people admire and which are 
mainly advertised via commercial media. Thus, the programme should be placed 
right in the middle of youth culture of music, fashion, pop icons and commercial 
brands. But despite the intended high media penetration, active interaction plays a 
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major role in the programme’s conceptualization, too. It is believed that self-
confident, optimistic youth are more careful and self-responsible when it comes to 
safe sex. It is also assumed that young people who involve in recreational activities 
and sports are less likely to use sex as a means of entertainment, identity and a means 
to compensate peer pressure. Thus, LoveLife promotes involvement in sports, 
creativity and group activities to boost the building of relationships and a sense of 
self-worth.295 
 
 4.6.2   Efforts, Impact and Unanswered Questions 
 
Of course, the questions that spring to one’s mind while reading the programme’s 
concept are: does it work and how is it implemented? Is it known and accepted by 
young people? Does it have a notable impact on the epidemic’s spread? It appears as 
if these questions can be answered with ‘yes’. Already three years after its inception, 
the programme was known by 62% of young people, 82% of which agreed that more 
open communication about sex and sexuality – a declared aim of LoveLife – can 
help reduce the risk of infection. 76% said that LoveLife made them aware of the 
risks of unprotected sex and caused them to talk about sex, sexuality and 
relationships with friends.296 Another aim – the more frequent use of condoms – 
seems to have been reached, too. In 2005, male youth aged 15 to 24 had rates of 
condom use as high as 72.8%, compared with 55.7% of females297 – a statistic that 
can perhaps partially explain why four times more girls are infected than boys. Also 
adults could not flee from the largest condom production on earth: in 2004, 346 
million condoms have been distributed, equating 22 public sector condoms per male.  
LoveLife seeks to tap in where governmental and social prevention efforts 
failed or fell short. As society was reported to be reluctant to address youth sexuality 
and the impact of peer pressure and sexual coercion on youth, LoveLife decided to 
fill this gap by supporting sexual communication, especially with the vulnerable 
group of newly sexually active 12 to 17 year-olds. LoveLife is keen on 
“spearheading a sea change from the traditional ‘doomsday’ approach”, which also 
included the failed ‘do or die’ message of the past.298 As most young people in South 
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Africa have stated to be optimistic about the future, but scared about HIV/AIDS, the 
programme uses a tone of optimism, rather than scare tactics, which have proven to 
have little credibility among youth.   
Conclusively, LoveLife fails to deliver profound facts and figures of the 
concrete and direct impact of their work, which perhaps is difficult to measure, 
especially when it comes to awareness. The figures at least do not speak a language 
in favour of the programme. The 2006 report of the Centre for AIDS Development, 
Research and Evaluation (CADRE) declares that “[i]t remains unclear why the 
efficiency of such programmes has been so negligible,” despite “no shortage of 
prevention campaigns and programmes in South Africa.”299 The rise of the epidemic 
is described as ‘surprising’. Reasons for failure of the various prevention 
programmes are thought to be inadequacies in methods and lack of co-ordination, a 
lack of concerted leadership of the Mbeki government, a failure to use local level 
responses in a systematic way and a lack of capacities of under-resourced NGOs and 
smaller community-based organizations.300 Although solutions seem to be hard to 
find, the authors of the CADRE report believe that realignments in the various 
sectors are the right and necessary step forward to change the course of the epidemic 
to the better.301   
LoveLife, however, succeeded in creating a broad knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
among youth: in 2001, 90% of young South Africans had a correct knowledge of 
HIV transmission. Unfortunately, the gap between knowledge on the one side and 
actual behaviour change and consciousness on the other seems to be the next 
challenge: over half of these apparently knowledgeable youth rated their chances of 
being infected as low or very low.302 Hence, consciousness raising and behavioural 
change must be targeted. This is done with massive media coverage on TV, youth 
radio programmes that are translated into all eleven languages, a helpline that is 
consulted by 250 000 youth per month, 1000 full-time volunteer peer educators 
(groundBREAKERS) who have 5000 12 to 17-year-old ‘mpintshis’ (friends), mobile 
health education centres on rails, a monthly youth lifestyle magazine and various 
information brochures on treatment for youth and communication methods for 
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overtaxed parents.303 It appears that a lack of prevention programmes can hardly be 
blamed for an absent success.     
 In the end, the word ‘success’ is terribly difficult to define when it comes to 
HIV/AIDS responses. Within all this hardship and never abating new challenges, we 
are sometimes tempted to lower our expectations and interpret a step in the right 
direction as success. But there can be no declared success of prevention programmes 
when the number of infections is rising – particularly despite massive national and 
bi-lateral investment. Yet, a hypothetical question remains, which will never be 
answered: how much worse would the epidemic look like without such programmes? 
No one knows where South Africa would be without them today. 
 
4.7 A Sea Change in South Africa’s AIDS Policy Landscape? 
 
A very recent and highly surprising paradigm shift in South African AIDS policy in 
November 2006 could silence a few inveterate government opponents and bring 
some unexpected and long lost hope back to sufferers and fighters. Their hope and 
optimism seemed to have been legitimately buried by the flawed prevention 
programmes, indifferent and resistant government sentiments and ever-growing 
death and infection tolls. Yet, there are formerly unknown signs of governmental 
policy and behaviour change that might be interpreted as heralding a new era in 
South Africa. In the face of past government behaviour, unheard-of statements and 
official actions confuse pessimists and shake fatalists out of their apathy. 
 In November 2006, the government announced a new strategic five-year plan 
of prevention, treatment and care for people living with HIV/AIDS. This plan 
includes the aim of putting 650 000 people in need of antiretroviral therapy on the 
essential drugs by 2011.304 Admittedly, a very ambitious aim; unfortunately, also one 
that will probably not meet future demands, when approximately one million people 
will need treatment in 2011, as TAC members interjected.305 According to 
government information, 235 378 people were on treatment on 273 accredited 
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facilities plus 80 000 more in private sector health care in September 2006.306 Last 
UNAIDS suggestions in June were 125 000 people less.307 Although it is estimated 
that 380 000 are in need of treatment at this very moment, activists and patients 
welcomed the new government approach. More unprecedented commitment was to 
be witnessed in September, when deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ncguka was 
appointed to turn the tide in the fight against HIV/AIDS. She revitalized the 
neglected South African National AIDS Council, which was reported to have rarely 
met under controversial predecessor Jacob Zuma.308 Jacob Zuma has been 
internationally ostracized for his confusing public statement at court that he ‘washed 
off’ the virus after he had sex with an HIV-positive women.309 The new deputy 
president also broke the tradition of not fraternizing with TAC members when she 
talked to leaders of the campaign and spoke at a conference co-hosted by TAC. 
Moreover, deputy health minister, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, who took over from 
controversial, ‘lung infected’ health minister Tshabalala-Msimang, positively 
shocked at a civil society AIDS conference. She publicly admitted government 
failure to control and slow the epidemic and provide treatment.310 Subsequently, she 
held a compassionate speech, which contained unprecedented words that seemed to 
acknowledge the danger of the disease as well as past mistakes such as a shortage of 
health professionals and lack of infrastructure and propagated better access to 
treatment for prisoners, children, pregnant women and people with TB.311 This and 
the fact that for the first time a speech was printed on the health ministry’s web page 
can be seen as a landmark.  
The essence of political leadership for a successful response to the disease has 
been sufficiently mentioned and proven. Now, for the first time in South Africa a sea 
change seems to occur. The collaboration of government, civil society and 
communities is new to South Africa and a great and unprecedented fact. But 
simultaneously, it is a sad fact. It is hardly believable that a country with over five 
million HIV-infected people, 1000 new daily infections and 900 daily deaths312 
needed two decades to publicly acknowledge and admit the epidemic’s severity and 
past deficiencies. It remains challenging for activists and people living with 
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HIV/AIDS to forgive and forget. But the time is now – South Africa’s forces have 
never been working so closely together before. There are no guarantees. But there is 
hope – unprecedented hope.  
 
4.8 The Future – Social Threats, Demographic Challenges and Economic 
Calculus   
 
Although it appears that civil society campaigns can finally reap their harvest and 
important steps are being made, the future bears challenges as unprecedented as these 
new government strides. Currently, 380 000 people are said to be in desperate need 
of treatment, but government statistics, the credibility of which remains unchecked, 
suggest that 315 000 people are receiving antiretrovirals. However, it needs no 
sophisticated prognoses to see that all of the five million people living with 
HIV/AIDS at the moment will at some, very certain stage in their lives be dependent 
on antiretrovirals, which they then must take until they die. Of course, these five 
million people in South Africa ‘only’ represent 12.5% of all people living HIV/AIDS 
on earth. And of course, they will not fall ill at the same time. But one day they will.  
And this has consequences. Prognoses of the most various and frightening 
kind have been undertaken to sketch the pandemic’s future path. Yet, it appears vital 
to differentiate – no easy task with merely hypothetical assumptions. LoveLife 
suggested in 2003 that by 2010 the toll of people living with HIV/AIDS could rise to 
ten million.313 Yet, although it sounds strange at first sight, this does not necessarily 
have to be negative. Currently, 1000 new daily infections and 900 daily deaths in 
South Africa almost cancel each other out. Reducing the number of HIV-infected 
people by letting them die can impossibly be rated as positive. Sheer numbers can be 
deceiving. Logically, if the government and private campaigns can successfully 
pursue their aim to put more people on treatment, the number of infected people 
rises. A successful response to an epidemic would be declining new infections and 
increasing provision of treatment, thus reducing the number of the dying, thus 
leading to a greater total of people living with HIV/AIDS. This would undoubtedly 
disappoint and upset the public, which is probably incapable of ‘reading’ the 
numbers correctly. The formula ‘declining numbers are good – rising numbers are 
bad’ is only applicable and true if the epidemic is slowly and as natural as possible 
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dying out, i.e. when new infection rates abate and antiretrovirals cannot prolong life 
any longer, thus resulting in a relatively ‘natural’ death. Unfortunately, this is rather 
utopian. The opposite formula ‘rising numbers are good – declining numbers are 
bad’ can therefore only be true in the case sketched above, when mass dying is 
averted by providing more and more people in need of treatment with antiretrovirals, 
thus preventing a neutralization of new infections with deaths.    
However, the number of infected people is often object to global prognoses 
that help calculate economic impacts, plan future development aid and shape 
pharmaceutical business. German Der Spiegel quotes scientists who predict that by 
2025 the global number of infected people will reach 100 million.314 Mathers and 
Loncar of the WHO report that in 2030 6.5 million people will fall victim to the 
epidemic every year, making AIDS the largest infectious disease on earth.315 Yet, for 
Africa, Cleland and Sinding predict, “that epidemics in western and middle Africa 
will not follow the devastating trends seen in southern Africa.”316 Instead, they 
suggest that continued high fertility, rapid population growth, a lack of birth control 
and contraceptive support programmes will be the major drivers of poverty on the 
continent. 
For South Africa, Barnett and Whiteside predict that the economy will be 
17% smaller in 2010 than it would have been without AIDS.317 According to a study 
that they quote, the GDP per capita will then be 8% lower than without the epidemic. 
This can be traced back to a slower growth in productivity, but mainly to “the shift in 
government spendings towards health, which increases the budget deficit and reduces 
total investment.”318 Singh adds that the killing in the most productive years leads to 
reduced labour forces, which increase the ratio of dependants and, thus, cause unseen 
demographic scenarios and challenges.319 Moreover, he argues that the economic 
diminution could impinge on foreign investments and other Southern African 
countries. Even peace and stability in the region could be at danger, as 17-22% of 
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South Africa’s 2800 peacekeepers, who secured relative peace in countries such as 
Burundi, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are thought to be HIV-
positive.320 
South Africa’s AIDS crisis is a test for the country’s social values and 
solidarity. Increasing government expenditures for the ever-growing number of 
people in need of treatment, orphan care and extensive prevention programmes must 
result in taxation increase. Nattrass argues that those who are economically better 
positioned and have access to treatment, education and health facilities will probably 
prefer a policy that prioritizes economic growth and minimizes taxation.321 As a 
matter of course, AIDS is a disease strongly linked to poverty. And the poor do not 
have a strong lobby to steer policy making. Hence, AIDS challenges South African 
solidarity in new and unseen ways. In 2002, a few far sighted multinational financial 
services groups such as Alexander Forbes or Old Mutual and mining houses such as 
Anglo American, AngloGold Ashanti and De Beers have started internal treatment 
roll-out due to the absence of governmental programmes.322 Singh reports that these 
efforts had a limited effect because of stigma and the fact that only few firms 
followed these examples. But as the epidemic evolves and will increasingly weaken 
productivity, South Africa cannot afford stigma anymore. These initiatives must at 
least be supported if the government fails to provide the necessary drugs to maintain 
its work force. Also the Ministry of Defense started two well-praised programmes for 
army members named the Masibambisane Campaign and Project Phidisa, which is a 
collaboration between the South African National Defense Force, the US Department 
of Defense and the National Institute of Health.323 Such exemplary and apparently 
functioning programmes will be necessary in new and unprecedented extents to 
maintain an intact army and, as Singh brought up before, peace and stability in the 
region.  
South Africa has wasted considerable time in the past and now faces the 
burden of its missed chances and unused opportunities. The country failed to tame a 
disease that will threaten the country’s integrity and maintenance – both socially and 
economically. Hopefully, the apparent, recent sea change in governmental AIDS 
policy is to be taken seriously. South Africa cannot afford to keep the struggling 
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forces separated. The country has served as a negative and deterring international 
example for too long. The downward spiral of unemployment, poverty and AIDS can 
unleash social and demographic worst-case scenarios that will not leave the 
economically safe untouched. Nevertheless, the economic elite does not depend on 
the majority of those affected by the disease. It might by assumed that those vital for 
the country’s economy, i.e. skilled workforce, will be saved and a model of triage 
will dominate the following years of treatment provision, which will let AIDS ravage 
the economically insignificant poor and unemployed. What makes this situation a 
moral dilemma is the fact that the skilled labour force can save the affected poor and 
unemployed – but not the other way round. This is the cold calculus that Nattrass at 
some stage of her book referred to as ‘the moral economy of triage’. 
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5.    International Intellectual Property Law 
 
Approximately thirteen years after the discovery of HIV/AIDS, expanded access to 
treatment was made possible in developed countries and first showed notable results 
on the reduction of mortality rates. The mid-1990s brought new medicines to 
developed nations, which included three kinds of ARVs in various combinations: 
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase 
inhibitors and protease inhibitors.324 In 1997, the US Food and Drug Administration 
approved over 50 therapies, which could be used either for the treatment of 
opportunistic infections or to slow or disrupt viral replication. When in 1998 it was 
reported that AIDS mortality decreased by 75% during the last four years in the 
United States, major efforts were made to expand treatment access in developed 
nations. A huge medical and biological breakthrough was achieved. This 
breakthrough brought dramatic survival benefits to people living with HIV/AIDS and 
averted long-term costs related to opportunistic infections and hospitalization.325 As a 
matter of course, it contributed substantially to enhancing the quality of life of 
infected people, allowing them to continue their jobs and prolong life. ARVs brought 
an end to the assumptions that AIDS equalled death and showed that important steps 
were made to make the disease less deadly. Moreover, the sale of AIDS drugs has 
become a multimillion-dollar industry in developed countries for companies such as 
Abbott Laboratories, Merck and Co. and Roche Holding AG.326 Yet, it was only a 
question of time when activists, development aid workers, NGOs and private 
campaigns would wonder publicly why those most severely hit by the disease and, 
therefore, most desperately in need of treatment had almost zero chances to get a 
hold of it. Comparing the numbers of infected people in regions such as sub-Saharan 
Africa with those in Europe and the United States made this a legitimate question. As 
dying of AIDS silently took its course in resource-limited settings, international 
consternation, protest and pressure mounted. Reich and Bery report that a paradigm 
shift was to be observed. While previously, many people wondered if it was “feasible 
or desirable” to treat AIDS patients in poor countries, treatment access to AIDS 
                                                 
324
 Cf. Michael R. Reich and Priya Bery, “Expanding Global Access to ARVs: The Challenges of 
Prices and Patents,” 2004, The AIDS Pandemic: Impact on Science and Society, Kenneth H. Mayer, 
H.F. Pizer (California: Elsevier Academic Press, 2005) 325. 
325
 Cf. Reich and Bery 325.  
326
 Cf. Kristine Novak, “The WTO’s Balancing Act,” The Journal of Clinical Investigation, Vol. 112, 
Nov. 2003, 1269, http://www.jci.org/cgi/content/full/112/9/1269 (accessed 30 Dec. 2006).  
  81 
drugs was more and more “expected and demanded.”327 Yet, it had very soon to be 
acknowledged that apart from a host of other obstacles, two major barriers stood in 
the way of providing treatment to the poor: prices and patents. 
                              
5.1  Unravelling the Great Controversy: Point, Counterpoint 
 
Patents and prices had been clearly backsighted by activists and NGOs, who 
collectively saw them as the most impeding obstacles in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
Yet, pharmaceutical companies and the WTO did not agree so unanimously to these 
assumptions. As the dying continued and medicine prices as well as international 
copyright law, set and regulated by the WTO, remained unchanged, activists accused 
pharmaceutical companies of consciously holding back medication and, thus, being 
partly responsible for numerous avoidable deaths. Patents, originally designed to 
secure protection of the inventor against abuse of his or her product, grant the 
licensee the opportunity to keep exclusive rights, which allow regulation of prices 
and, thus, successfully avoid competition, in the absence of equally applicable 
inventions, i.e. generics. It was argued by activists that avoidance of competition for 
medication and a monopoly of prices are ethically irresponsible, as it only saves 
those who can afford to accept the price policy of pharmaceutical companies and 
completely leaves out those who are most desperately in need of treatment. 
The opposing side argued that a removal or relaxation of patents would 
unavoidably remove incentives for pharmaceutical companies to create and test new 
drugs.328 This was a legitimate point. But, of course, it was also a very calculated 
response. The pharmaceutical industry knew that a lack of new drugs to better and 
more efficiently cure diseases and global health threats would definitely not be in the 
interest of those who fight for better treatment of all kinds of diseases, e.g. malaria 
and TB. This argument was surely aimed at arousing fear and wanted to say that all 
want the same. A lack of new drugs, the unavoidable consequence of patent 
relaxation or removal, as it was argued, would be serving no one – neither activists 
nor companies nor those who need it. Despite the apparent calculus, patents serve as 
a guarantee for companies to recoup their research and development costs.329 
Without this financial safety net, it is likely that firms withdraw from taking the risk 
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of investing millions of dollars in clinical trials and drug approval – especially as the 
outcome of trials and duration of approval remain unclear. The drug research and 
development database Pharmaprojects already reported that the number of studied 
antiretroviral compounds fell from 250 in 1998 to 173 in 2001 – a decrease partly 
owing to pressure on companies to give the drugs away for free after approval.330 
Nevertheless, the opposing side responded that the argument of cost compensation 
for drug development tests does not justify high prices and still valid patents in most 
cases. Most antiretrovirals were tested and approved by public institutions and public 
funds and the development costs for most drugs have long been recouped. 
Zidovudine, for example, better known as AZT, was first synthesized even before the 
discovery of HIV/AIDS in 1964. Most of the research that proved the drug’s 
effectiveness as an antiretroviral was done by the US National Institute of Health and 
was sold to Glaxo Wellcome in 1987, which sold the drug for extremely high prices 
and kept the patent until the usual expiration of 20 years.331 This also accounts for 
other drugs like didanosine, stavudine and zalcitabine, the patents of which are held 
by public authorities that have granted rights to commercialisation to private 
companies on an exclusive basis. All this is weakening the pharmaceutical 
companies’ point that they have to recoup ‘their’ development costs in all cases.332     
 On the other hand, the assumption remained dubious whether patents were 
the main obstacles in the way to provide regions like sub-Saharan Africa with drugs. 
Overwhelming national poverty, dilapidated, insufficient health-care systems, 
economic stagnation, political instability and the impact of stigma and 
discrimination, which prevents people from getting tested and consult counselling, 
were named far greater barriers.333 This also results in a dangerous and typical catch-
22 case: people do not get tested as long as there is no treatment available – but there 
is no need to provide treatment as long as people do not get tested. Furthermore, a 
lack of infrastructure, doctors, nurses, diagnostics, clean food and water stand 
massively in the way to increase treatment access. Harvey Bale, director-general of 
the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, also 
stated that politicians often blame patent restrictions to avoid criticism for their own 
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inability to take care of the people and for their own abuse and mismanagement of 
resources.334 Despite the possibility of this remark and all other obstacles, it remains 
questionable how sub-Saharan African countries can afford European or American 
prices. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) argued that infrastructure would follow once 
treatment is affordable and that there were no incentives for governments to even 
think about expanding infrastructure and health facilities as long as treatment 
remains utopian and beyond reach.335  
 In October 2001, when the debate over Intellectual Property Rights (IPS) and 
their limiting effect on treatment access culminated, Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-
White published an empirical study in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA), which scrutinized whether the charges of patents being the 
main obstacle to HIV/AIDS treatment in sub-Saharan Africa were true. Yet, the 
financing of the paper appears slightly dubious, which makes its content and 
objectivity questionable: Attaran (Bachelor of Laws, Doctor of Philosophy) and 
Gillespie-White (Bachelor of Laws) were financially supported by the Center for 
International Development at Harvard University (Dr. Attaran) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, a UN specialist agency (Ms Gillespie-White), 
explains the paper itself.336 It also informs us that “[a]fter the study was completed 
and the manuscript submitted, the International Intellectual Property Institute 
received a grant from Merck for US$25 000.”337 However, the paper concluded that a 
variety of obstacles were impeding treatment access such as the poverty of African 
countries, the high cost of antiretroviral treatment, national regulatory requirements 
for medicines, tariffs, sales taxes and most urgently a lack of sufficient international 
financial aid – but not the patents of the 15 antiretroviral drugs examined in 53 
African countries.338 What appears interesting here is the assumption that high costs 
of drugs are partly responsible, but not patents. Patents and prices are neither the 
same nor interchangeable. Yet there is a correlation. It has been omitted that patents 
successfully avoid generic competition and importation under the then WTO law. 
Both would substantially lower prices. However, the two authors found out that only 
a very small number of patents exist in Africa. The reason for this simultaneously 
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hints at the source of the problem: Africa’s share in the pharmaceutical market is 
1.1% of the global whole, thus making it “commercially negligible,”339 compared to 
“the lucrative North American and European markets,”340 which secure the 
profitability of drug research. For most pharmaceutical companies in most African 
countries, the cost of patenting and the difficulty of enforcing these patents before 
the respective judicial systems of the countries are not worth the effort.341 Hence, as 
the authors found out, most antiretrovirals remain unpatented in most poor countries, 
freeing companies from charges and leaving African countries with the legal 
potential to make use of the absence of patents – if they could. MSF and Oxfam 
claimed that the paper is used as justification for companies’ further inaction to 
introduce differential pricing and questioned the paper’s validity due to the US$25 
000 from Merck. However, they stated that the most practical and sought-after 
formulations have been strategically patented, while drugs left unprotected typically 
are impractical in resource-poor communities.342 And indeed, as explained above, 
patents are only licensed when it makes sense economically. Hence, two of the 
biggest manufacturers, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim, patented 
their products. The only country with a high number of patents was South Africa. 
This is in no way surprising, as the country’s large number of infected people and its 
relative wealth distinguish it substantially from most African countries and make it 
economically interesting and potentially profitable. Yet, Attaran and Gillespie-White 
certified no difference in use between drugs from Abott Laboratories, patented in 0 
countries, and from GlaxoSmithKline, patented in 37 countries.343 This result can 
bring us back to the immanent and easily applicable argument of poverty, which 
would clear pharmaceutical companies of responsibility and the charge of massively 
impeding treatment access. Many companies would undoubtedly welcome this. But 
this result can also bring us back to the debate over unaffordable prices, which would 
surely be welcomed by MSF, Oxfam and others.  
 The paper closes with the conclusion that the economies of Africa could not 
even afford more than a few percent of the cost of treatment. As a consequence, the 
failure of wealthy governments to provide sufficient financial aid has predominantly 
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to be blamed.344 These two points appear legitimate. They hint at what had to happen 
and also happened in the next years. Firstly, prices had to be considerably reduced 
and adapted to African health care resources. Secondly, financial aid had to be 
increased to provide the necessary supplement to the still unaffordable costs of 
treatment. And thirdly, the WTO Intellectual Property Rights had to be amended, so 
that patents do not block the importation of cheaper generic drugs. It had become 
obvious at that stage that the extensive use of generics and the amendment of IPS 
were inevitable and the only way to put an end to the mass dying in resource-limited 
environments in Africa.        
 
5.2 The Original Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual   
               Property Rights (TRIPS) 
 
This sub-chapter summarizes the most important aspects of the original TRIPS 
agreement under the WTO, enacted in 1995, and points out its deficiencies, which 
later were object to massive criticism, controversy and campaigning. Its original 
contents also provide the prerequisites for the comprehension and necessity of the 
amendment.   
Pharmaceutical companies issue patents on their products under the TRIPS 
agreement of the WTO. These patents prohibit copying and production, hence, 
guarantee a temporarily limited market monopoly during which the producer or 
inventor gets the chance to recoup their development or research costs. In 1995, the 
TRIPS agreement granted WTO member countries the right “to codify certain 
standards of patent protection into national law.”345 The deadline for the agreement’s 
implementation was set to 2001 for developed countries and 2006 for least-
developed countries. As this was a very strong and restrictive step towards licensing, 
certain safeguards had been included in the agreement, of which ‘compulsory 
licensing’ is a noteworthy one. Compulsory licensing allows national governments 
“to revoke the monopoly privilege conferred by a patent and allow other producers to 
enter the market where it is in the public interest, such as for the protection of public 
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health.”346 This is a way of circumventing the agreement of the patent holder, which 
is not necessary for a compulsory license. In exchange, the patent holder must be 
paid a reasonable licensing fee. Yet, as the most affected countries are impoverished 
and generally do not even have the opportunity to produce generic drugs themselves, 
another safeguard had been included. ‘Parallel importation’ allows such countries “to 
obtain the lowest priced patented drugs offered on the world market by importing 
from countries where the drug is sold at a lower price.”347 Nota bene, parallel 
importation only refers to patented, conventionally produced drugs, i.e. without 
compulsory licensing and without the advantage of obtaining cheaper generics. 
Unfortunately, even the cheapest prices are far beyond such countries’ opportunities.       
Certain drugs remain unpatented, which allows for generic production and 
competition without the need (and process) to apply for compulsory licensing. 
Generic production of patented drugs via compulsory licensing is restricted to a 
domestic market and, thus, excludes exportation.348 Drugs are patented in certain 
countries, when the licensee expects consumption and sale of the product, i.e. when 
the licensee fears loss of profit due to potential copying. Hence, as declared in the 
previous sub-chapter, drugs remain unpatented in countries in which their use is 
questionable or improbable. Unpatented drugs are often less effective and more 
difficult to apply – which is one reason why they are unpatented. Nevertheless, by 
means of compulsory licensing and the production of unpatented drugs, certain 
countries such as Brazil or India, which both started quite early with generic 
production, were given the opportunity to establish a treatment programme. Many 
treatment programmes are firmly founded on generic production and would look 
considerably different without it: Thailand’s ARV programme, for example, 
expanded more than eight-fold between 2001 and 2003 – but the budget merely 
increased by 40%.349 Another example is Brazil, which produced seven out of 14 
drugs it distributed in 2003. But three of the patented drugs it had to import from 
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multinational pharmaceutical companies accounted for 63% of its US$200 million 
annual budget in 2003.350  
Yet, and this is a critical point, the people most affected by the disease, i.e. 
people in Africa, live in countries which do not have the technical facilities and skills 
to make use of these unpatented drugs. Moreover, under the TRIPS agreement, they 
are not allowed to import drugs from generic producers. This results in the following 
distribution of medication: wealthy nations are provided with the best, most effective 
and most easily applicable drugs. Low-to-middle income countries with a 
pharmaceutical industry are partly capable to set up treatment programmes with less 
effective, but functioning, second-class drugs. And those who have no drug 
manufacturing capacities and cannot afford legal importation of patented and 
expensive European or American drugs, could, however, partly afford to import 
drugs from generic producers, but are not allowed to. 
 It had soon been realized that this legal situation did not only leave the poor 
disadvantaged, but also those who are most severely affected and dying in highest 
numbers. Médecins Sans Frontières argued that under the original TRIPS agreement, 
patent holders create market monopolies by having the legal right to avert 
competition.351 Moreover, they accused pharmaceutical companies of decreasing 
treatment access by intentionally omitting differential pricing. According to their 
charges, patent holding companies “charge globally whatever price the Western 
markets will bear […] to maximize profits in developed countries without attempting 
to enter less lucrative markets.”352      
In May 1998, the issue of intellectual property rights and their connection to 
public health was first raised at the annual gathering of member states of the 
WHO.353 Public concern was further voiced at the WTO meeting in Seattle in 
December 1999. On the XIII International AIDS Conference in Durban, South 
Africa, in 2000, “[l]eading scientists, government agencies and activists all argued 
that it is no longer acceptable that the vast majority of people with HIV/AIDS are left 
without treatment.”354 Since then, provision of affordable treatment has become a 
worldwide concern and vital part of debates, conferences and activism, which soon 
were to make a considerable change.      
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5.3 The Way to Increased Treatment Access Is Being Paved – Five 
        Corner-Stones 
 
AIDS activists, people living with HIV/AIDS, generic pharmaceutical companies 
and several NGOs drew more and more media attention to access barriers. They 
succeeded in attributing a major role to the topic on international health and UN 
policy agendas. Additional attention was drawn on the issue when activists and 
Nelson Mandela publicly opposed the lawsuit brought (and eventually withdrawn) by 
39 drug manufacturers against South Africa’s Medicines and Substances Act of 
1997.355 International agencies and pharmaceutical companies responded to the 
pressure by promising new mechanisms that aimed at expanding access and reducing 
prices in developing countries.  
The first notable corner-stone was a UNAIDS project called the Drug Access 
Initiative set up in Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire in 1997, which achieved a decrease in 
prices from US$12 000 in 1997 to about US$7200 in 1999.356 Although much is not 
reported about the initiative and the price difference may seem insignificant, as still 
tremendously too high to make a change, it was a first serious attempt, which the 
next could be based on.  
The second, more serious undertaking was a collaboration of UNAIDS, co-
sponsoring international agencies and six pharmaceutical companies called the 
Accelerating Access Initiative (AAI), established in May 1999.357 The WHO 
reported that as of June 2002, 19 countries had signed agreements on reduced drug 
prices. By June 2003, 76 000 people were on antiretroviral treatment – an 
insignificantly small proportion considering the actual number of people in need.358 
Yet, it was only another step of many more to come. And the efforts put pressure on 
pharmaceutical companies and international donors as they increasingly unveiled and 
emphasized a public health disaster.  
A vital corner-stone of the global development of treatment access was Brazil 
with the first full-scale national commitment to provide universal and free access to 
ARV therapy for all its needy citizens.359 Its high-level political commitment and 
legal enactment of treatment guarantee in the 1996 constitution were unprecedented 
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and pioneering for developing countries. By developing capacity for local production 
of generics and threatening with compulsory licensing, Brazil achieved price declines 
of ARVs to US$5000 in 1999. These declined further to US$2000 per patient per 
year in 2003, and the country succeeded in halving its mortality rate.360 Of course, 
this remarkable success evoked hopes and ambition to replicate it, especially as 
Brazil counts among developing countries. Yet, the Brazilian AIDS response took 
benefit from a few, but vital advantages, which make it rather unique and, thus, 
difficult to reproduce in other countries. Brazil is not only often referred to as a 
model for a successful AIDS response, but it is also deemed to be highly influential 
on the world’s ARV access development. Hence, it deserves greater attention, 
examination and its own sub-chapter (see 5.4). 
The fourth corner-stone of enhanced international treatment affordability is 
the country of India with its 2001 Cipla offer. Very recent estimates have shown that 
the number of HIV-infected people in India has outdone that of South Africa. 
Currently, 5.7 million people are estimated to carry the virus.361 However, drug 
producers started early with ARV manufacture. In the late 1990s, they focused on the 
domestic market and began to explore export opportunities.362 None of the generic 
AIDS drugs were covered by product patents in India, which paved the way for a 
thriving future drug industry. As of 1998, the annual per patient cost of a protease 
inhibitor-based HAART regimen reached US$689 per patient per year.363 From then 
on, prices declined steadily. The introduction of generic nevirapine into the Indian 
market in 1999 allowed for the legendary and unexpected Cipla offer in February 
2001: the generic company offered to sell ARV combination therapy at US$350 per 
person per year to MSF and at US$600 per person per year directly to governments 
in poor countries.364 This announcement was a giant stride, especially as the lowest 
market price worldwide for a triple combination therapy at that time had merely 
reached US$10 500. These price differences admittedly appear grotesque – although 
even within European countries, pricing can differ remarkably. Nevertheless, the 
huge discrepancy between former offers and the Cipla announcement had a major 
impact: on the one hand, it shifted the debate from unaffordability to infrastructure, 
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health care provision and also adherence – the other major obstacles in the way to 
treatment access and efficacy. On the other hand, it discredited former price offers of 
American and European companies of US$13 000. For the first time, it was unveiled 
that these prices were not set in stone and that alternatives were possible that could 
make a real change. At the end of 2002, international pressure and low-cost generic 
competition caused another steep decline in drug prices. The improved affordability 
and availability of generic non-nucleoside-based HAART was reported to enhance 
people’s willingness to get tested and consult counselling.365 Beyrer et al. also report 
that despite the social hurdle of stigma and discrimination, HIV was no longer 
perceived as a fatal disease.366 Nevertheless, it remains a sad fact that the dramatic 
price reduction to one or two dollars per day is still more than a lot of people can 
afford – in India and elsewhere. 
In the fall of 2003, the generic drug industry witnessed another stark decrease 
in treatment pricing. The William J. Clinton Foundation announced a new 
partnership with Indian and South African generic producers and community 
organizations to provide triple-drug therapy at 38 cents per patient per day in Africa 
and the Caribbean.367 Prior to this offer, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and 
Malaria had been established and promised an increase in people receiving ARVs to 
500 000 until 2008 through Fund-supported programmes. Moreover, PEPFAR had 
been founded in May 2003 and announced to put two million people on treatment 
within the framework of its five-year plan that included a US$15 billion 
commitment.368 Despite this ambitious – or euphoric – undertaking, the achievement 
of this goal looks at least questionable at the moment. However, the 38 Clinton cents 
rang in a new era in treatment pricing and revealed unprecedented possibilities. 
These US$144 per patient per year made the US$12 000 suggested by European and 
American pharmaceutical companies not necessarily appear in a favourable light. It 
is inadequate to compare the production methods, costs and efficacy of these two 
offers. Yet, the feasibility of such small prices made the former ones look illegitimate 
and hardly comprehensible. It remains unsettled whether pharmaceutical companies 
in Europe and the US repeatedly tried to block generic manufacture because they 
knew or feared that these prices would partially discredit their own ones.       
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These five corner-stones mark the way to increased treatment access and 
document the dramatic decrease by 98% in four years – from US$12 000 in 1999 to 
US$200 in 2003. Yet, uncertainties remain. The future generations of ARVs are not 
yet covered by current agreements and policies. Moreover, in 2005, “India revised its 
patent laws to comply with WTO rules, potentially preventing the country’s generic 
pharmaceutical industry from manufacturing generic equivalents for drugs patented 
after 1996.”369 UNAIDS states that these revised laws will probably not hinder 
India’s people to receive therapy, especially as a few patents for first generation 
drugs such as AZT will soon expire.370 But these laws may prevent countries from 
looking to India for affordable generic equivalents of second-line antiretrovirals. This 
is a great future danger. Treatment regimens are usually complex, demand 
appropriate lifestyles, individual medical adaptation and monitoring before, while 
and after treatment, which demands specific services and facilities.371 Inconsistent 
adherence may lead to drug resistance, which will then demand new second-line 
ARVs. Moreover, treatment access does not solve the problem alone in poor 
countries. Affordability does not equal availability. And availability does not 
automatically secure efficiency. Treatment availability can impossibly be the 
complete answer. But it is a vital part of the answer. The way Barnett and Whiteside 
put it explains a lot, when read symbolically, and throws us back to a far more 
complex and far-reaching problem: “Medications may have to be taken at certain 
times of day, sometimes on an empty stomach, sometimes on a full stomach. The full 
stomach may be a problem in many cases.”372     
 
5.4 Brazil Sets a Milestone in Treatment Access by Enabling Generic 
Competition 
 
A number of countries show how not to respond to impending health crises. Others, 
like Botswana, Thailand or Brazil show how to respond to health threats and serve as 
a positive example, a model that is frequently admired and thus examined and 
partially adapted. As shown in the Botswana and South Africa chapter, the varying 
circumstances, history and wealth often do not allow for replication or repetition, as 
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they determine the epidemic’s individual form and, thus, its individual responses. 
Nevertheless, these successful responses can and should serve as a model for 
countries with less efficient strategies. Brazil’s story of generic production, its 
commitment to free ARV provision and its courage to make full, legitimate use of 
TRIPS safeguards, despite the risk of economic sanctions, is such a model. It delivers 
affluent potential for adaptation. But it also contains specific features that exclude 
replication. 
 Brazil is home to more than one third of the estimated 1.6 million people 
living with HIV/AIDS in Latin America.373 In 2005, AIDS claimed 59 000 lives and 
140 000 people became newly infected with HIV, which led to more people living 
with HIV/AIDS and made the epidemic’s growth likely. Yet, another reason for the 
increase in the total is the coverage of antiretroviral therapy. Approximately 73% 
(294 000 out of circa 400 000 people) in need were on ARV treatment at the end of 
2005 in the whole of Latin America.374 Brazil delivered treatment to 170 000 of its 
209 000 needy citizens.375 Compared to the global average and coverage in Africa, 
this figure is exceptionally high. Brazil, the main manufacturer and deliverer of drugs 
in Latin America, also succeeded in providing these drugs free of charge, making the 
country’s AIDS policy even more outstanding and bewildering.   
First, the 1988 constitution guarantees universal access to health care. In 
1996, when it dawned on government officials that HIV/AIDS would increasingly 
put weight on the health care system, Brazil amended it with a law that assured 
universal access to antiretrovirals.376 Not only did the constitution itself build a solid 
ground against future health threats. The political commitment to steer the country 
through future obstacles was perhaps even more vital. Nevertheless, universal and 
free treatment provision was also brought about by a strong civil society movement 
that effectively put pressure on the government to integrate universal access into the 
law and into official policy.377 Apart from political commitment, civil society 
campaigning has emerged as a vital ingredient of successful AIDS responses 
throughout this work.  
Next, Brazil was a member of the WTO and therefore bound to TRIPS and its 
patent restrictions. But the country started early with the production of unpatented 
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drugs – as TRIPS only applied to ARVs patented after 1994 – and it dared to use the 
agreement’s safeguards such as compulsory licensing sensibly and self-assertively.378 
Although the agreement suggests that it “does not and should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health,”379 the usage of this particular 
safeguard turned out to be used differently from its original conception. Compulsory 
licensing had soon evolved into a means to put pressure on countries. Apart from the 
point that TRIPS is often criticized for its bureaucratic deterrence, opponents often 
argue that countries with big pharmaceutical industries threaten with economic 
sanctions.380 And indeed, certain countries such as Thailand bowed to economic 
pressure in the aftermath of the economic crisis and did not question the concessions 
made by the US in terms of market monopolies and anti-competitive sales 
practices.381 First, the Thai Safety Monitoring Programme had been used to provide 
protection and monopolies to American drug companies and second, only after 
demonstrations in Bangkok and the US, Thailand dared to ignore US warnings 
against the use of compulsory licensing.382 Yet, threatening with compulsory 
licensing is a vital part of Brazil’s success of pushing down prices effectively. 
Pharmaceutical companies that were already part of the Brazilian market chose to 
offer cheaper prices rather than completely vanish from the market with this 
respective product.383 Brazil often faced economic sanctions, but refused to bow. 
This confident behaviour allowed a persistent and effective use of compulsory 
licensing, which successfully drove down prices in Brazil for patented drugs. Yet, 
many countries can economically not afford the resistance Brazil met international 
(i.e. mainly American) pressure with. In the end, TRIPS did not prevent Brazil from 
‘taking measures to protect public health,’ as the agreement suggested. Brazil only 
chose a rather different reading than might have been originally intended while still 
acting within the legal framework. Perhaps it can be said that Brazil constituted the 
counterweight to the political power play of major pharmaceutical companies and 
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their influential lobby. However, Lazzarini and Von Kohorn postulate that wealthier 
countries, which were opposed to Brazil’s efforts to obtain affordable 
pharmaceuticals should consider that their trade sanctions, maintenance of high 
market prices and threats against utilizing compulsory licensing can swing back on 
themselves and the international economy when these countries demand international 
assistance.384 Yet, despite its legitimacy, this thesis seems to be based on a rather far-
sighted and sensible approach, which does, however, follow the logic of profit, but in 
a rather indirect way, which might not appear concrete and visible enough for certain 
companies and countries. 
However, the often commended offensive use of compulsory licensing as a 
negotiating tool and the country’s wit to recognize and exploit major companies’ 
desire to remain in the market are not the only ingredients of Brazil’s success. 
Though being a positive example to learn from, various features will make a 
replication difficult or improbable for poorer nations. Firstly, Brazil had a relatively 
small HIV prevalence rate of 0.7% in 2000, which decreased to estimated 0.5% in 
2005.385 This figure appears admittedly small and hardly threatening. Therefore, it 
emphasizes the country’s great commitment even more. Simultaneously, it makes 
one wonder why the country acted so intensely, compared with many other countries 
that only began to act when their prevalence rates already put the population’s 
existence at danger. But in 1994, Brazil was threatened with projections that foresaw 
a number of 1.2 million people living with HIV/AIDS in 2000 – and this sinister 
vision partly drove Brazil’s AIDS policy, which succeeded in halving this number.386 
Secondly, Brazil’s relatively high income of US$2830 per capita (in 2003) and its 
already established strong national pharmaceutical industry will hardly be found in 
many developing nations, but paved the AIDS policy’s way in Brazil.387 Thirdly, the 
country received three World Bank loans in 1993, 1998 and 2003, altogether worth 
US$425 million to help finance its huge free ARV programme.388 It might be added 
that many countries face difficulties to accept certain loan terms of international 
financial institutions. 
Fourthly, Brazil drew major benefits from a quite peculiar right, integrated in 
its patent law, which allows the country to produce patented drugs in an emergency 
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situation. Hence, in 2000, government officials decided that if the patent holder fails 
to start production in Brazil within three years, local generic companies are allowed 
to produce them instead.389 The US government complained that this provision in the 
Brazilian law breached international property rules and did not comply with 
TRIPS.390 Yet, the UN Human Rights Commission approved a resolution that 
secured access to medical drugs during pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, i.e. during 
health emergencies as enacted in Brazilian patent law. In June 2001, the US retracted 
the complaint and Brazil agreed to give the US a ten days notice before starting 
compulsory licensing procedures.391 Of course, this was a huge success for Brazil 
and others, too, as the quarrel and the panel between Brazil and the US led to an 
amendment to TRIPS: in November 2001, the WTO decided at its fourth ministerial 
conference to allow use of compulsory licensing in cases of national public-health 
emergencies.392  
This supported Brazil’s law and also its mechanisms and methods to achieve 
its goal. Many lawsuits were brought upon in the global fight for increased treatment 
access, often related to property rules and pharmaceutical companies. Almost 
surprisingly, many of these lawsuits were decided in favour of the rather 
disadvantaged party as shown in the case of South Africa, Thailand or Brazil. This 
fact only supports what runs like a thread through the Brazilian success story: the 
refusal of bowing to intimidation and an unwavering and self-assertive use of legal 
rights can make the difference in the fight against HIV/AIDS.  
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5.5 TRIPS Revisited: The December 2005 Amendment Rectifies an Old 
Deficiency 
 
The controversy around TRIPS, the WTO, patents and market monopolies is not 
abating. And admittedly, considering the stark contrast of interests the WTO must 
reconcile and the attempt to create a balance between the needs of suffering people 
and pharmaceutical companies, how could it abate? Since the WTO’s establishment 
in 1994 as a result of the Uruguay Round of the trade negotiations in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the organization has been the global 
governing body of the international trade regime.393 Its efforts to reconcile opposing 
interests are challenging and often described as a constant balancing act between the 
parties involved. The WTO’s range of advocacy is as broad as interpretations of the 
organization’s true intention and function. Reich and Bery state in 2004: “The WTO 
sets the legal ground rules for international trade and promotes the objectives of non-
discrimination, liberalization of trade barriers, competition, and transparency.”394 But 
this is only one interpretation. Lazzarini and Von Kohorn seem to have a slightly 
different impression:  
Likewise, international legislative bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) create 
treaties meant to protect and promote commerce at the international level. Such treaties, while 
clearly beneficial to the international business community, can have a drastic economic impact on 
poorer countries.395     
However, the dispute of Brazil and the US over the South American country’s 
Article 68 on patent law and the unabating discontent of insufficient treatment access 
led to an amendment at the fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001.396 It had been argued that TRIPS safeguards such as compulsory 
licensing helped countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Thailand to extend its 
already established local pharmaceutical industry, but put poorer countries at a 
disadvantage. Compulsory licensing is of no use for least developed countries 
without pharmaceutical capacities, and parallel importation of patented drugs does 
not drop prices enough to be affordable for these countries. In 2001, the WTO added 
the emergency amendment declared in its Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health to the law. It stated that “[e]ach member has the right to determine 
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what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.”397 But this did not cure the deficiency described. Hence, the WTO stated in 
the declaration:   
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing 
under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to 
this problem and to report to the General before the end of 2002.398  
The Doha Declaration further postponed the deadline for the 49 least developed 
WTO member countries to bring their legislation in compliance with agreement 
standards from 2006 to 2016 and, moreover, asserted a general priority to public 
health over intellectual property.399 However, the dearth of generic import and export 
remained an old deficiency, which had to be rectified in order to achieve the goal of 
public health primacy. In Geneva, in August 2003, the member countries agreed to 
modify the TRIPS provisions relating to compulsory licensing and made the 
importation of generic drugs produced under compulsory licensing legal.400 Yet, it 
was not until December 2005 that the agreement was confirmed as an amendment to 
TRIPS. Nevertheless, despite this belated, but vital step, the controversy around the 
amendment was ongoing and probably remains ambivalent. Then WTO director-
general, Supachai Panitchpakdi, announced emphatically that “‘it proves once and 
for at all that the organization can handle humanitarian as well as trade concerns.’”401 
Yet, while South Africa, India, Brazil and Thailand were understandably content 
with the decision, as it will secure economic prosperity of their drug industries, the 
spokeswoman of the Kenya Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines stated that 
this would make it difficult for developing nations to promote their own 
pharmaceutical industries.402 On the one hand, this is a well-known general problem 
of importation, but on the other hand, it might also increase dependency of poorer 
countries on wealthier nations.  
One of the biggest American pharmaceutical multinational companies, 
GlaxoSmithKline, states on the company’s web page that it supports the Doha 
Declaration and “does not believe that the TRIPS Agreement prevents people in the 
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developing world from getting access to medicines.”403 And indeed, despite 
numerous American efforts to block generic production in recent years in various 
countries, there are indications of a paradigm shift in multinational pharmaceutical 
companies. In 2003, South African activist group TAC accused GlaxoSmithKline 
and German giant corporation Boehringer Ingelheim of anti-competitive sales 
practices and excessive pricing, which the South African government later agreed 
to.404 In December 2003, both companies granted licenses to four South African 
companies to manufacture or import generic versions of AZT and lamivudine (3TC). 
Moreover, contrary to standard policies, the two companies charge only 5% royalty 
fee for sales of the drugs, and the manufacturers are permitted to export the drugs to 
all 47 sub-Saharan countries.405 This was surely an unprecedented agreement. 
MSF and Oxfam declared in a joint statement that the TRIPS agreement 
imposes legal, political and economic obstacles and described it in general as “a 
burdensome system.”406 Indeed, countries appeared to face major difficulties making 
use of the safeguards. MSF often emphasized that countries needed assistance in 
employing their rights under TRIPS. Facts seem to underscore this view: 
Mozambique became the first African country to implement the Doha Declaration. 
But according to Reich and Bery, prior to Mozambique, no country has made use of 
compulsory licensing.407 Yet, changes appeared in recent years. UNAIDS reports that 
in 2004-2005, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other 
partners “assisted 36 African countries to make best use of the flexibilities and 
safeguards available for accessing essential medications under the WTO’s agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”408       
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6. Conclusion 
 
The examinations in this paper have shown that Peter Piot’s statement at the XVI 
International AIDS Conference in Toronto in August 2006, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, appears to have a daunting legitimacy: the UNAIDS executive director 
aroused consternation when he stated that we have to plan the next 25 years with 
HIV/AIDS. In fact, it seems very likely that the disease, despite its already large 
extent and consequences, is still in its wake.  
Sub-Saharan Africa and examples of other impoverished nations have shown 
what the disease is capable of in terms of substantially changing society, demography 
and culture in poorer countries. But it does not appear that the epidemic in these 
regions has reached its peak. On the contrary, if Dejan Loncar and Colin Mathers of 
the WHO are correct in projecting that by 2030, 6.5 million people will die annually 
of AIDS, as mentioned in the sub-Saharan chapter (2.2.1.2), then the current 
devastation is merely the tip of the iceberg in certain regions. Moreover, based on the 
portrayed mutual relationship (or vicious circle) between poverty and AIDS, the 
disease will grow exponentially and will make a successful response increasingly 
challenging and the approach more comprehensive, as the roots of poverty must be 
fought.  
In fact, the examinations in this paper have not only shown how HIV/AIDS 
impinges on society and culture, but also how social, cultural and political 
circumstances either attract or reject the virus and its spread. Since HIV/AIDS is the 
focus of this paper, the impression can be given that the disease is the only problem 
in certain regions. But it is also a product and result of a far greater range of social 
problems and suffering. Solutions for deficient situations in impoverished countries 
are fighting poverty and gender inequity, securing peace and democracy, 
strengthening political commitment, ensuring better health care and education. All 
these solutions are proven to decrease the epidemic’s impact. These efforts seek to 
tackle deficiencies that are clearly AIDS-related, but these solutions refer to 
independent problems that often weigh heavier than the AIDS epidemic in the first 
place. Moreover, the necessary efforts to rectify these deficiencies can impossibly be 
undertaken by the AIDS community alone. The fight against HIV/AIDS is dependent 
on global commitment to fight the problems that provoke high-risk behaviour and 
increase vulnerability and impact. 
  100 
If the fight against poverty, AIDS and global inequity includes development 
aid and intervention of developed countries, which it probably does, then this leads 
us automatically to the challenge of a culturally adapted and sensitive intervention. 
Reimer Gronemeyer and people with similar sentiments fear that African culture and 
integrity will fall victim to increasing western intervention in Africa. And indeed it 
has been proven that certain African cultural traditions attract the virus and push its 
spread ahead. They are said to stand in the way of prevention methods that proved 
efficient in western societies. Among various other differences, scientific thinking 
and understanding and ratio grossly based on enlightenment appear way more 
prevalent in European and other developed countries. They needed centuries and 
millenniums to evolve and massively influenced life here. It must be acknowledged 
that concepts based on these achievements and characteristics cannot simply be 
imposed on starkly differing cultures. Hence, solutions must be found that avert 
growing AIDS crises in Africa while simultaneously preserving the continent’s 
cultural wealth.      
Throughout this paper one insight recurred numerously: never before so much 
has been done to tackle the global disease – but simultaneously, the epidemic has 
never risen so fast before either. This juxtaposition, these synchronic events do not 
release hope. It rather appears that the current fight and the current apparently 
overwhelming and unprecedented efforts result from the insight that the global 
community has failed to acknowledge the gravity and potential impact of the disease. 
Now, mammoth undertakings are brought under way to desperately catch up on what 
had once been short-sightedly neglected. Of course, the global fight against 
HIV/AIDS will not take benefit from desolation or resignation. And indeed, it 
remains a given that collaborations, international partnerships, public and private 
efforts combined have never been so strong, committed and united before. The list of 
abbreviations and acronyms of this paper not only proves a large quantity of 
movements, organizations and committed undertakings: the various chapters have 
demonstrated that an awful lot is done at the moment to change the epidemic’s 
course. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UNAIDS, WHO, 
PEPFAR, the vaccine and microbicides campaigns, civil society movements like the 
treatment campaign in South Africa and elsewhere…all fight to decrease the impact 
of the disease.  
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 Unfortunately, the chapters on microbicides and a vaccine rather sketch a less 
optimistic picture of future female prevention tools and a possible antidote. As 
estimated by the GCM (and mentioned in 2.1.2), microbicides might avert 1 300 000 
million deaths. But apart from the fact that this sum is enormous, it still represents a 
small share of infected people. It has been shown that the discovery of a microbicide 
is a vital step – but undoubtedly not the last one. Apart from approval and financing, 
delivery and usage remain further obstacles.  
 The scientific challenges of designing a vaccine have also been portrayed as 
tremendous and complex due to the virus’ viral genetic diversity both within an 
individual body and around the globe. Clinical trials, drug approval and providing 
access are equally challenging. But the chapter on intellectual property law, patents 
and prices also shed a light on the commercial and profit-oriented part of the ‘AIDS 
industry.’ There must be a reason that the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative or 
EuroVac were founded and committed themselves to universal access of a possible 
vaccine to resource-constrained settings. In other words, the international pressure 
pharmaceutical companies would face in the case of a vaccine discovery would be 
enormous and hence reduces the (commercial) incentives for companies to invest 
grossly in vaccine research. From a profit-oriented view, this makes sense, 
particularly as those in most desperate need of a vaccine are poor and unprofitable. 
Of course, one could argue that on the grounds of Chapter Five, generic competition, 
the relaxation of patents in TRIPS and the massive fall of ARV prices, treatment 
provision might not be lucrative enough anymore. But this is deceiving. Prices might 
have fallen to US$144 per patient per year in certain offers and efforts, but the 
developed world constitutes the major market of treatment for most pharmaceutical 
companies. Prices will remain high in these parts of the world. Most companies do 
not depend on a market which merely constituted 1.1% of the global share in 2001, 
as mentioned in 5.1. Moreover, despite the anti-trust law, it remains unlikely that 
prices fall in the developed world as they did in developing countries when patents 
expire after 20 years. And polemically speaking: who knows really if a vaccine is not 
already developed? Healthy people do not make the pharmaceutical industry prosper. 
People who are sick and dependent on treatment are vital for this industry’s 
maintenance and prosperity. This may sound terribly cynical. Yet, it is very neutral 
information and it has certain implications. 
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 Nevertheless, Chapter Five was written when the peak of the controversy 
over prices and patents was already over. Of course, treatment access is still a 
considerable obstacle. But after patent relaxation, price reduction and the possibility 
of producing and importing antiretroviral drugs, other hurdles to increased treatment 
access must be overcome. Pharmaceutical companies are less to blame – or to be 
made a scapegoat. This picture has changed. Substantial barriers have been removed. 
Countries need more assistance in applying TRIPS safeguards, even though legal 
obstacles constituted far bigger obstacles three or five years ago than they do now. 
When the number of people living with HIV/AIDS will rise in the years ahead, it will 
hopefully be due to increased treatment provision and saved lives rather than due to 
the amount of new infections. Yet, it appears quite likely that both will be the case: 
the number of people living with HIV/AIDS will rise as projected due to more new 
infections, and mortality will decrease due to better treatment access. But in general, 
the starting position for treatment provision has never been that advantageous before. 
Vital TRIPS amendments have been successfully postponed for a while, but 
eventually made. Prices are down as much as they can be. The global AIDS 
community has acknowledged that treatment is possible and also effective in terms 
of prevention: ARV therapy decreases stigma and discrimination, favours 
counselling and testing and reduces infectiousness, as the reduction of viral load in 
HIV-infected people also reduces the grade and risk of transmission. These insights 
are as evident and widespread as never before – although they are, of course, not 
evident and widespread enough. The procrastination and intransigence of the South 
African government have shown how slow insight can proceed.                       
 Another positive aspect that emerges from this paper is the fact that apart 
from certain models in developed countries, which are not or hardly applicable in 
resource poor environments, positive models also occurred in developing countries. 
Botswana’s success was vital for many other (sub-Saharan) African countries to 
convince them that such a demanding and highly complex undertaking such as a 
comprehensive HIV/AIDS response is actually possible in poorer countries. Brazil, 
Thailand, Uganda or Botswana proved that it is possible. These models were absent 
many years in the global fight against HIV/AIDS and their blueprints are now 
available. It has been explained in the paper why a reproduction or copying is seldom 
possible, but also why a partial adaptation is feasible, sensitive and commendable.  
The examples are there – affected countries must ‘only’ follow suit.  
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Yet, the South Africa and Botswana Chapter both showed – in two different, 
contradicting ways – that political commitment substantially decides over 
mismanagement and failure (South Africa) or efficacy and success (Botswana). A 
political will can be decisive. But activist campaigns such as the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) in South Africa or private movements in Brazil and Thailand have 
shown that people ‘on the ground’ can make a change. Proofs are the various 
lawsuits that were predominantly won by campaigners, e.g. in South Africa in the 
case of MTCTP and treatment provision in prisons. But also people in Thailand and 
Brazil have pushed the fight against AIDS in their countries tremendously forward. 
Hence, it can be summarized that a successful response is ideal when it is consistent 
with government commitment and private activism, but at least depends on one of 
the two. Without governmental or public devotion, chances are minute to bring AIDS 
epidemics around the globe to a halt. Yet, this situation is not rare and will further 
fuel the spread and secure its growth and existence.         
Admittedly, writing about an issue such as HIV/AIDS without getting 
emotionally involved is frequently demanding. Several occasions appeared in this 
paper, when euphemisms had to be used to express something that should have been 
said more directly, i.e. less scientifically. Words like ‘affected’ were used instead of 
‘killed,’ expressions like ‘inequity’ were preferred to ‘injustice,’ which often 
appeared more appropriate, ‘bewildering’ or ‘discomforting’ have been employed 
rather than ‘infuriating’ or ‘horrible.’ Even the word ‘challenge’ was often used to 
describe something that is most likely not to be achieved. However, it can hardly be 
denied that a lot of hardship is connected with this peculiar sickness and still growing 
disease.  
It would be edifying to know that a successful future global response will 
make the daunting tone of this paper obsolete and its content only a relic of a dark 
and bygone age, perhaps something that will be referred to as the ‘pre-AIDS vaccine 
age’ in the future?  
Although it appears that this kind of thinking is unrealistic, a vision is needed 
– as urgent as a sea change in global efforts and thinking. Ignorance and indifference 
will not bring the disease to a halt or reverse. The past showed that already. The only 
question that remains is: is it realism or pessimism to say that history is doomed to be 
repeated?  
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